Emmanuel Elias

Usually, the decision of war and peace is a right exclusively preserved to the state. This fact does not solely reflect a state’s ability to consolidate power.

Rather, it underscores a deeper distinction between sovereignty and subjection. However, Lebanon’s case is quite different.

For decades, instead of operating as an active actor exercising its full responsibilities within its borders, the Lebanese state has been acting as a passive subject of foreign dictations. 

As opposed to a widely held belief, this chronic inability is not merely a result of “state weaknesses” or “external pressure”. Neither can it be automatically solved through the dismantling of Hezbollah’s military apparatus alone. Hezbollah may be portrayed as the main barrier today; which is politically acceptable.

However, denying the fact that Hezbollah is a result of an already-broken system which has been stuck in historical patterns of crises would be analytically incomplete. The complex truth we have been ignoring for decades is that Lebanon’s crisis is not political, it is deeply structural.

The Lebanese state immersed itself in this repetitive cycle since 1969 as a result of the Cairo Agreement which formally legitimized the military presence of Palestinian Militias in Southern Lebanon. While the stated goal of the PLO back then was to conduct military operations against Israel, events which unfolded followingly advanced a more complex, yet expected reality: the PLO’s activity turned out to be directed toward the Lebanese state. This illegitimate presence was widely considered as the main trigger behind the Lebanese civil war which officially started in 1975.

However, it is noteworthy to mention that the PLO issue was not perceived by all Lebanese factions as a source of threat. In contrast, a large segment of the Lebanese not only supported the PLO presence, they sided with them in their armed conflict against perceived Lebanese foes. Such polarized and hostile alignments did not emerge from a vacuum. The late 1950s witnessed a quite similar scenario where leftist groups (mainly Muslims) aligned themselves with external actors (Abdul Nasser back then) as an attempt to overthrow Camile Chamoun’s presidential mandate. While the Israeli invasion of 1982 put an end to the Palestinian armed presence in Lebanon, it did not effectively resolve the sovereignty issue. The Syrian regime was already embedded in Lebanon’s political and security system, which has been further consolidated during the aftermath of the Taif Agreement. When the Assad Regime withdrew from Lebanon in 2005, some perceived this event as a historical opportunity to restore the state’s sovereignty and achieve real independence (14 March alliance) while others (8 March Alliance) felt that an existential security umbrella was suddenly removed. The same applies to Hezbollah’s involvement in the Syrian civil war, or the last two wars in support of Gaza and Iran. These repeated patterns reflect one fixed reality: what has been perceived by one side as a self-defense and resistance against a certain aggressor was considered by the other as a clear violation of national sovereignty and independence. Building upon that, a crucial question surges: does the crisis essentially lie in the state’s inability to monopolize power or in the system’s structural loopholes which misalign with the diverse nature of the Lebanese society? As long as this question is not seriously considered, discussions over potential breakthrough reflect nothing more than symptomatic failed attempts. Lebanon reflects a clear model of a heterogeneous polity, where national cohesion cannot be enforced through a centralized governing system. Several examples similar to the Lebanese model are present across the world. In such models, diversity is celebrated, not enforced, and national cohesion means respect of pluralism, not imposition of a single national identity or narrative. Therefore, the sovereignty crisis is not an issue of “state capacity”, it is an issue of how this sovereignty is planned to get achieved. If the foundational point of disagreement lies in the divergent perceptions toward historical narratives, security guarantees and communal priorities, then the answer is rooted in the very structure of the system. Banning Hezbollah’s military apparatus today will eventually lead to short term stability. However, overlooking the foundational importance of structural reform will regenerate the same marginalization at the long term which in its turn would push toward security-seeking outside the state’s authority. A comprehensive and serious solution to this perpetual crisis transcends mere policy reforms or minor governance adjustments. It urgently requires a restructuring of the political system itself: An honest acknowledgment of Lebanon’s pluralistic nature, and the establishment of a system which celebrates this diversity rather than erasing it. Only then can the consolidation of power be established: not as an enforced dictation, but as a shared conclusion.