The PMF Law: A Red Line in U.S.-Iraq Relationsby Claudia Groeling*

Baghdad is moving toward a vote on the draft Authority Law that would formalize the PopularMobilization Forces (PMF) and its 238,000 fighters as a permanent branch of the Iraqi state.Passage of the legislation would grant the force a formal structure and dedicated budget.

Backedby Prime Minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani, the bill has raised alarms in Washington, whereU.S. lawmakers warn it would entrench Iranian influence in Iraq’s political system.

The Trump administration has made its position clear: if the PMF is formally integrated,Washington will respond with diplomatic consequences. On July 22, Secretary of State MarcoRubio cautioned Prime Minister al-Sudani that the legislation risked institutionalizing Iranianinfluence within the Iraqi state, thereby undermining national sovereignty.

The subsequent lettersent to al-Sudani also reportedly stated that the law could trigger sanctions on Iraq’s energysector and fundamentally alter the U.S.-Iraq relationship.Ambassador Steven Fagin, U.S. chargé d’affaires in Baghdad, reiterated these concerns in Julyand August to senior Iraqi political leaders, when he stated that the PMF Law would strengthenarmed terrorist groups and embed Iranian influence. Since then, a State Department official hascharacterized the proposal as “deeply unhelpful.” Similarly, analysts in Washington argue thatenshrining the PMF in law would make future dissolution or reform virtually impossible. Thedebate has also transitioned into Congress, where criticism of the PMF Law is broadlybipartisan; U.S. lawmakers across the aisle are wary of Iraq shifting fully into Iran’s orbit.The new law directly contradicts Washington’s longstanding position toward the issue. While theU.S. may have initially tolerated PMF activity during the anti-ISIS campaign beginning in 2014,the U.S. has since largely sought to limit PMF activity in the formal security sector.Washington’s relationship with the PMF shifted sharply from tolerance to opposition after theterritorial defeat of ISIS in 2017 in Iraq; the shared purpose that had bound both sides togetherwas lost. When the U.S. pressed Baghdad to rein in the PMF in 2018, the group instead tightenedits grip on power. The year 2020 was the breaking point. When the U.S. killed Qassem Soleimaniand Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis in Baghdad, this cemented Washington’s perception of the PMF asan Iranian proxy.Washington views the integration of the PMF as a direct threat to its investments in Iraq. TheU.S. has provided about $13.8 billion in funding from 2015 to 2023 to Iraqi security forces;institutional support of the PMF is widely viewed as a direct challenge to the security objectivesof the Iraqi state. The legislation also introduces significant implications for U.S. forces in Iraq.With about 2,500 American troops deployed in an “advise-and-assist” mission, the formalizationof the PMF could raise security concerns for U.S. personnel and complicate its relationship withIraq’s Ministry of Defense.The debate over the PMF Authority Law is inseparable from the wider U.S.-Iran rivalry playingout across the Middle East. Ongoing discussions about Hezbollah’s potential disarmament reflectthe Trump administration’s core belief that state institutions cannot function effectively alongsideentrenched militia structures. At a moment when Iran’s proxies are particularly weak, thisdevelopment poses a significant threat: granting Tehran an institutional foothold inside Iraqprecisely when its influence across the region is under pressure.Washington views the PMF Law as a red line. For U.S. officials, its passage would represent theformalization of Iran’s influence within the Iraqi state. In their view, the move would diminishIraqi sovereignty, constrain the possibility of reform, and weaken U.S.-Iraq relations. ForWashington, the PMF Law is not just legislation. It is a battle against Iranian influence

* research assistant in The Washington Institute's Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation Program on Great Power Competition and the Middle East.