After the series of strikes carried out by the United States on June 22, 2025, Iran must give up all illusions: Donald Trump does what he says and time is no longer on the regime's side.

Tehran used to stall, maneuver, request delays, resist, make promises without intending to keep them, and issue threats without certainty of follow-through. The Iranian regime set its timing according to a shifting mood, part radical and hardline, part pragmatic and open—but the Trump era is proving incredibly rigid, and its timelines are not flexible.

There is now an imbalance unfavorable to Iran: either it complies with U.S. demands or faces a military strike that could topple a regime which has suffered from internal instability for months. All the military strength the Iranian regime possesses cannot match the world’s largest and most capable military.

Is the Iranian regime now considering how it might survive in Trump’s narrow timeframe? It would be a kind of irony to imagine that Iran has anything to offer the world short of Trump's demands.

Iran, having parted with its illusions

Trump is negotiating with Iran at its weakest point. It today is not the same country that once dominated Lebanon, Syria, Gaza, Yemen, and Iraq. There is a new balance of power under which Iran is incapable capable of shaping the region’s destiny. It is possible that its influence was always an illusion, promoted by Russia when, advocating a solution to the Syrian issue through the Astana meetings, raised the profile of Iran as a credible interlocutor. The Iranians convinced themselves that they had become the masters of the region: a new Persian empire.

Even when the United States withdrew from the nuclear agreement, Iran could find countries in the European Union willing to listen and, in one way or another, mitigate the effects of U.S. economic sanctions. But that era is over. Due to serious miscalculation, Iran has lost the ability to pressure regional countries through its now-cut-off proxies. The European Union turned its back on Iran not because it had grown weak or lost most of its regional influence, but because it had blatantly exposed the reckless nature of Iran’s project—one that shows no respect whatsoever for international law.

Although Iran still maintains decent relations with China and Russia, neither country is prepared to defend it against U.S. threats, which are fundamentally justified by the fear of an immature, peace-hostile regime possessing nuclear weapons whose timing and use cannot be trusted.

Given these circumstances, there is little reason to be optimistic about direct negotiations between the United States and Iran. Iran has received the U.S. conditions in writing and was already aware of their content, having previously rejected them. It is unrealistic to expect the United States to retreat from its demands, and equally unrealistic to expect Iran to return to zero enrichment—unless it faces a U.S. strike compelling enough to change the prevailing calculations.

A limited U.S. strike is the solution

Iran is therefore waiting for a decisive strike in order for negotiations to be genuine. To enter negotiations submissively, it would have to convince its people that it is prioritizing their interests over the principles of the regime or the revolution. But would that be an acceptable price—sacrificing the nuclear program to preserve the regime, while leaving the protesting population as the ultimate losers?

This scenario may seem far-fetched, but what is even more unrealistic is holding negotiations where both sides insist on staying at their opening positions.

The Iranian side may be exaggerating misunderstandings in an attempt to buy time, but time has become precious for the U.S., especially after its intelligence agencies warned that Iran could produce its bomb within a short period.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.