Some members of the five-member committee were not comfortable with the timeline outlined in the army’s second-phase plan to inventory weapons, which prompted a direct meeting with Army Commander General Rodolphe Haykal to clarify the approach he presented. It was said that the process could extend up to eight months, which could affect not only the Support the Army conference but also Lebanon’s chance to recover and emerge from its crisis.

In addition, international support and its nature could change depending on circumstances, potentially causing Lebanon to miss an opportunity it either failed to seize or could not exploit. The practical outcome of the capitals’ understanding of Lebanon’s reasoning or approach will be reflected in the Support the Army conference and the decisions made there. It should be noted that the conference is not limited to providing financial aid to the army; it also aims to support the institution with a long-term vision connected to the next phase, after UNIFIL leaves Lebanon and the country regains full sovereignty over its territory.

All of this comes at a time when delays by Lebanon could open the door for Israel to escalate further, especially given the fragility of Lebanon’s stability and Israel’s continued attacks. While there is significant appreciation for the capabilities of the Lebanese army and an understanding of the obstacles it faces, the timeline discussed for inventorying weapons north of the Litani appeared somewhat politically frustrating, particularly as it allows Hezbollah to strengthen its ability to control Lebanese political reality primarily, and other levels as well, regardless of its actual military capabilities or whether it could use them against Israel in the future.

The recent Cabinet session’s decisions regarding the army plan cannot be viewed very positively due to two important factors. First is Hezbollah’s insistence on challenging the government more than Israel, refusing to disarm in northern Litani, coinciding with the Cabinet meeting and sending multiple clear messages in this regard. Meanwhile, the army emphasizes its intention to avoid military confrontation and to carefully consider the situation on the ground, which only increases the party’s obstinacy. Although the government reaffirmed the decision to inventory weapons contrary to the demands of Naim Qassem, deputy secretary-general of Hezbollah, there are fearsthat his position could influence the army’s decision and the timeline set for northern Litani.

The other factor is linked to questions raised by the president’s efforts to contain the party by sending his advisors to meet with its leaders—efforts that have produced no results showing the party’s respect for the office or for the state’s authority, despite Naim Qassem placing responsibility on it. What Lebanon truly needs is for the party to announce its transformation into a political movement and to give up its weapons as a way to achieve its goals, rather than continuing to challenge the state by keeping its arms. This is the essential foundation for its integration of integrating under state authority and explicitly acknowledging that decisions of war and peace belong solely to the state.

Even if the party has not operationally cooperated with the Lebanese state in handing over its weapons south of the Litani—despite its claim that the ceasefire agreement applies only to that area, which is a partial reading—the state, which seeks exclusive control of weapons north of the Litani, faces a major challenge if the issue is limited to merely “containing” the party’s weapons, even if the influential states involved approve such an approach.

This decision by the party is precisely what the state needs. One can understand the idea of containing the weapons in light of this and the measures it could entail, such as placing heavy arms under state custody. Yet the party leaves the issue open for Iran to sell the weapons to the United States if it chooses, without preventing the party itself from attempting to sell them to the United States, or even to the Lebanese state as a secondary option, at least under current circumstances.

For this reason, it remains difficult to see how the army could implement its approach north of the Litani without the party’s cooperation, especially since the army will not resort to force and has refrained from searching private property south of the Litani despite pressure. Questions are also raised about whether the “mechanism” committee’s tasks extend to the north of the Litani and what framework governs them, alongside the fact that international forces are not authorized to operate outside their deployment zones—although some could argue that their mandate could stretch to the Lebanese-Syrian border if Lebanon requested it, which it will not.

All of these are influential factors, in addition to expectations linked to the launch of the disarmament process for Hamas in the West Bank and its outskirts, as well as the outcome of U.S.-Iran negotiations.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar