The unresolved plan for Gaza’s security force

Which countries will deploy forces to oversee all phases of restoring stability to Gaza and putting it on the path toward peace and reconstruction?

Sarkis Naoum

The unresolved plan for Gaza’s security force

The devastated Gaza Strip (AFP).

Information coming from Washington indicates that President Trump’s administration is preparing to announce the move to the second phase of implementing the agreement concerning the Gaza Strip. However, many details of this process remain unclear, especially regarding one of its most prominent and sensitive elements, which is the actual preparation of the force that will be tasked with deployment and providing stability.

Based on several reports, it is expected that the United States will supervise the mission, which will focus on three phases.

The first is stabilizing the security situation through wide deployments in Gaza, overseeing public order, and training Palestinian police forces in order to prevent chaos and the rebuilding of terrorist infrastructure.

The second is leading the disarmament of Hamas and other groups and establishing a permanent monitoring and verification mechanism to prevent rearmament.

The third is assisting the Peace Council and other civilian bodies in transferring local authority to the Palestinian Authority through a temporary technocratic committee, and later through the institutions of that Authority.

This would enable the establishment, meaning the ruling political-security establishment, to provide moderate and responsible Palestinian governance in Gaza.

Which countries will participate with their forces in following up on all stages of restoring stability to Gaza and putting it on the path toward peace and reconstruction? The answer to this question remains unknown. The reason is that it is not yet clear which countries will participate in the deployment, under what conditions, and in which locations they would prefer to be stationed.

Meanwhile, Hamas has firmly declared its opposition to disarmament, especially in Arab media outlets, and has proposed vague formulas for freezing or storing its military weapons. Egypt and Turkey insist that the international security force should focus on creating a buffer zone between Israeli forces and Hamas, but only after dealing with the issue of Hamas’ disarmament. As for Israel, it has informed the relevant parties that it will maintain a military presence along the Yellow Line it established, to which most of its forces in the Gaza Strip have withdrawn. This zone constitutes about half of the entire territory of the Strip.

What about the mission of the international security force? It is expected to be one of the main topics that Netanyahu has brought up in his discussions with senior American officials recently. This issue could have an important impact on defining the reality of Gaza in the near term. Therefore, officials must give priority to the following steps:

– Urging Washington to set aside its usual preference for fundamental principles and the duration of reconstruction, in favor of engaging directly with details that provoke conflict.

– Ensuring that the United States, Israel, Egypt, the Palestinian Authority, and other Arab countries firmly control the mission of the international security forces and the agreed-upon security protocol, which defines the areas of responsibility of the forces, the rules of engagement, and direct coordination in the executive mechanisms with Israel.

– Formally defining other important objectives for the international security forces, which are to lead and carry out operations to disarm Hamas and other organizations while implementing the disarmament of Gaza and creating conditions for Palestinian governance that is moderate, responsible, and sustainable.

If the International Security Force (IFF) is not given a clear mission and support for its responsibilities and strength, Israel will exert pressure to retain freedom of action against attempts by Hamas to rearm, will freeze any efforts to rebuild Gaza beyond the Yellow Line, and will retain the freedom to remain in its deployment areas inside Gaza until the matters mentioned above are addressed.

In short, the success of the second phase of the plan and the durability of the ceasefire depend on immediate security stabilization, gradual disarmament, and the transfer of authority to a corrected and restructured Palestinian Authority. None of this is achievable without a clear definition of the mission of the International Security Force (IFF), without sustained American involvement, and without active participation from moderate Arab states. If this does not happen, the risk of chaos and rearmament will remain high, and the current framework could lose its strategic value.

In addition to all of this, information from the American research community indicates that the International Security Force (IFF) is tasked, under Trump’s twenty-point plan, with training Palestinian police forces. This is important and a key element of the overall strategy. However, there is still no clear agreed-upon plan for implementing it, and no clear source of funding so far, noting that Ambassador Mike Waltz mentioned that some progress has been made in this area.

The Jordanian Police Training Center has expressed its readiness to begin preparing officers and officials from Gaza. Nevertheless, there must be agreement on a clearly defined path to accomplish all of this.

First, the Trump Administration and its partners need to secure funding, which amounts to millions of dollars, to train and equip Palestinian officers. Second, the United States, Jordan, and Egypt have each laid out their training plans. Israel must support this process, and the Trump Administration must push all these states to work seriously toward implementing the mission.

Notably, there will soon be a new leadership for the Office of Security Cooperation at the U.S. Embassy in Jerusalem, whose mission will be the “training link” between Israel, the Palestinians, and Jordan. However, despite all this, building a Palestinian security force will be a major challenge and may require years to fully complete, especially given that the initial signals are not promising. Still, the United States has an opportunity to put this process on a solid path of implementation.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar