After US President Donald Trump dismissed in his address to the nation the slim chances of announcing the end of the war and beginning a public negotiation track with Iran, and revealed that the war would continue for at least two to three weeks, it became clear that the Lebanese front, closely linked and perhaps even more connected to the Iranian front, would face a similar timeframe. This period would shape the path of Israeli advancement along the southern border and determine the point that Tel Aviv would consider sufficient to move toward the political track, which is currently stalled and entirely dependent on the impact of missiles and military progress on the ground.

All the factors that shaped the political scene before March 2, including the presidential initiative for direct negotiations with Israel, were rejected by both the Israeli side and by Hezbollah and, behind it, Tehran. Iran clearly and firmly declared that no negotiations could take place without Hezbollah at the table, just as the group had previously announced that it would not negotiate under fire because that would amount to surrender. From this statement, it was understood that Hezbollah disregarded everything that occurred before its involvement in the war and shifted its focus elsewhere, seeking to secure its place at the table directly through Iran rather than through the Lebanese state, which it dismissed from consideration the moment its leaders began asserting that they were the state.

The military track pursued by Hezbollah, alongside Tehran, runs parallel to a negotiation track aimed at reaching a deal with Washington and Tel Aviv that excludes the Lebanese state, whose presence would be merely formal or symbolic. The state has lost international trust due to its failure to meet obligations and its inability to implement its decisions, whether in matters of peace and war, in controlling southern Litani and deploying the army there, or in maintaining exclusive authority over weapons. The world has seen that the decision over peace and war remains in Hezbollah’s hands. The group has not surrendered its weapons but has instead increased its arsenal and maintained its military capabilities south of the river. Hezbollah is betting on undermining the state with its current leadership, including the presidency and government, ultimately aiming to change the system. It seeks through this strategy to secure the political gains of its presence and continuity after the heavy losses suffered during the war and its need for legitimacy to compensate the affected parties and rebuild.

Hezbollah and Tehran’s strategy is based on previous experiences in which Washington or Israel waged wars and ultimately reached deals with those they fought against. The war in Afghanistan with the Taliban is a clear example, as is the war in Syria, from which Mohammad al-Joulani emerged to enter under the name Ahmad al-Sharaa, and likewise in Gaza, where the details of the deal with Hamas remain unclear to this day. Among the resisting camp, some ask what prevents this experience from being repeated today with the Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah.

The recent meeting between Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdel Ati and a Hezbollah delegation signaled that discussions have begun on this axis. Hezbollah’s response, in which it was a listener and handed over the matter to the Speaker of Parliament Nabih Berri, was a second important indicator regarding the continuation of the status quo concerning the official authority representing the state and negotiating publicly in its name and implicitly in Hezbollah’s name.

Is Hezbollah’s strategy realistic? Will it lead to a deal with the group rather than with the state? Political sources respond that it is too early to judge the shape of the deal that the war will produce, but they are certain it will not serve the interests of the country or the party. Israel has revealed its intentions and is not willing to repeat past mistakes by withdrawing and leaving the field for Hezbollah to regain strength and influence. Accordingly, sources believe that Israel will not stop this time until Hezbollah’s military capabilities are paralyzed, not merely weakened, based on the principle that the goal today is to end Hezbollah’s influence rather than negotiate with it before that is achieved, similar to what happened with Hamas.

Therefore, sources anticipate that the war in Lebanon will be longer and broader than the conflict in Tehran, and that Berri, monitoring the developments, is waiting and preparing to join the negotiations at the right moment.

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Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar