Mojtaba Khamenei named Iran’s new Supreme Leader: Two possible scenarios ahead
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Ten days after the American and Israeli attack on Iran, which resulted in the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, the Assembly of Experts announced in an official statement on Sunday evening the selection of Mojtaba Khamenei, the 56-year-old son of Ayatollah Khamenei, as the third Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic.
In recent days, several members of the Assembly of Experts in Iran, responsible for electing the Supreme Leader, have spoken about this choice. However, the law stipulates that the official announcement of the leader is the responsibility of the Secretariat of the Assembly of Experts, and the personal statements of the members carry no legal weight. The ten-day delay in announcing the third Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic is attributed to two issues: first, concern over the possibility of assassination by the United States and Israel, a threat that still persists; and second, the insistence of the presidency of the Assembly of Experts on holding the meeting in person despite security risks.
Meanwhile, some clerics as well as political, military, and security figures, while stressing the urgency of selecting the new leader, have gathered and counted votes from Assembly of Experts members across the country. However, this procedure was not approved by the presidency of the Assembly of Experts, particularly by Ayatollah Hosseini Bushehri, chairman of the council's secretariat.
Away from the day‑to‑day coverage of recent events, the most important question indeed is: what impact choosing Mojtaba Khamenei as the third Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic will have on the regime’s policies, especially regarding the ongoing war with the United States and Israel? Based on current analysis and reporting, two broad scenarios can be envisioned
Before presenting these scenarios, it is important to note a significant aspect regarding Mojtaba Khamenei that makes predicting his decisions difficult and complex. His name was proposed as a potential successor to Ayatollah Khamenei fifteen years ago, following the widespread political protests after the 2009 presidential election. Since then, reports have consistently suggested that he plays an important role within the leader's office, particularly concerning political, military, and security institutions. For example, Mohammad Sarafraz, the former head of the Iranian Broadcasting Corporation, highlighted in his memoirs the great influence Mojtaba Khamenei enjoys.
However, over these fifteen years, not a single text or speech has been published presenting his views. Additionally, Ayatollah Khamenei himself has never mentioned his name publicly, nor issued any statement that could suggest his inclination to choose one of his four sons (Mostafa, Mojtaba, Masoud, or Meysam) as his successor. This has always left the future of leadership in Iran shrouded in uncertainty and makes predicting upcoming developments difficult.
The first scenario: Mojtaba Khamenei continues his father's policy
Accordingly, the two potential scenarios after Mojtaba Khamenei's selection are as follows:
1- According to the first scenario, which appears more likely, Mojtaba Khamenei will continue his father’s approach and policies as before. Unofficial reports suggest that military and security figures support his selection, but it is not expected that he will bring significant changes to the Islamic Republic’s policies. Many believe that despite Ayatollah Khamenei’s office having been targeted in two attacks, the cohesive structure and security organization of his office will be maintained and rebuilt with the selection of his son; in other words, the influence within the “House of Khamenei” will continue.
Regarding the ongoing war, the selection of the new leader and the strengthening of military and political leadership cohesion are likely to escalate confrontation with the United States and Israel. The declared policy of the Islamic Republic, which emphasizes the need to punish the United States for what it describes as military aggression against Iran, is expected to continue.
Ali Larijani, Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, and Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf have confirmed this policy in their latest official statements, indicating that they view Mojtaba Khamenei as a supporter and have expressed strong backing for it, even taking positions contrary to President Masoud Pezeshkian, who had called for halting attacks on Arab countries.
If this scenario materializes, there is also a potential risk of assassination of the new leader. Donald Trump has noted at least twice that if the new leader continues his predecessor’s policies, he may be targeted by the United States and Israel. Such an action, if carried out, could further destabilize the Islamic Republic and potentially lead to its collapse.
The second scenario: Mojtaba establishes better relations with the world
2- The second scenario assumes that Mojtaba Khamenei may open a new path and space in Iranian politics. Some of his supporters have referred to him as “Iran’s Bin Salman” in virtual discussions for years, claiming that, contrary to what his opponents suggest, he is interested in development and establishing better relations with the world. However, these supporters have not provided any documents or evidence to substantiate this claim.
If we assume this proposition is true, Mojtaba Khamenei could initiate a new era in the governance of the Islamic Republic by revising previous policies, particularly those concerning relations with the United States, especially in light of Washington’s statements following the military attack on Iran about paving the way to influence or overthrow the Iranian regime.
Advocates of this scenario suggest that his leadership might bring a general amnesty for political prisoners, open up the political arena, foster political competition, and work to improve relations with other countries, especially Gulf states, leveraging all political and administrative capabilities within the country regardless of political orientation. Accordingly, the ongoing war could end, and a ceasefire might be declared. According to the Iranian constitution, declaring or stopping a war, as well as the general leadership of the armed forces, falls under the prerogatives of the Supreme Leader.
The only evidence supporting this scenario comes from unofficial reports suggesting that the late leader, in recent years, was aware of some differing approaches by his son in politics and foreign relations and therefore restricted his powers, limiting news about his activities. Indeed, some security figures close to him, such as Hossein Taeb, the former head of the Revolutionary Guard’s intelligence organization, were removed from their positions.
Nevertheless, significant ambiguity remains: if Mojtaba Khamenei seeks to implement fundamental changes in the Islamic Republic’s policies, how will he address the regime’s supporters and social base who may oppose these changes? And how will he manage to overcome their resistance?
In conclusion, it can be said that although political reality is first shaped in the minds of politicians, its transformation into concrete decisions depends primarily on surrounding events and the actions of others. Therefore, following the announcement of Mojtaba Khamenei and his assumption of the role as the third Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, the most important factor will not be what unfolds in his mind, but the course of developments that will reveal which of the two scenarios ultimately becomes reality.