Dr. Muhannad Al-Azzawi

The Middle East war broke out on February 28, 2026, as some prior assessments had anticipated. In the months leading up to it, the United States, in cooperation with Israel, worked to gather extensive intelligence that allowed them to map the lifestyles of the Iranian leadership, headed by Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, including his inner circle, personal security measures, and movement routes. This effort helped determine the “zero hour,” when a sudden strike was carried out that embodied the concept of shock and intimidation by targeting the presidential building with precise, high-impact strikes. According to this scenario, the operation resulted in the death of the Iranian Supreme Leader and a number of senior political and military officials, including the Minister of Defense, the commander of the Revolutionary Guard, and the head of the intelligence service, as part of a strategic attempt at what is known as “decapitation” or separating the leadership from the system’s structure.

Following this, Iranian forces began implementing what is known as the “dead hand” strategy, which allows operations and strikes to be carried out without referring back to the political leadership if it is lost. Indeed, the region witnessed intense military responses, including the launch of cruise missiles, ballistic missiles, and drones targeting locations in the Gulf and the surrounding region, under the pretext of targeting U.S. bases. It should be noted that, according to this scenario, U.S. forces did not use those bases directly in the attack, relying instead primarily on air and naval capabilities, while repositioning some forces outside the bases in the days before the strikes began.

From Limited Strike to Full-Scale War

In this scenario, the U.S. administration believed that targeting the top leadership could improve its negotiating position and push Iran to accept a set of U.S. conditions, potentially ending military operations quickly. However, if this goal was not achieved, the plan would escalate the conflict toward a full-scale war aimed at regime change.

Accordingly, U.S. forces began operations to achieve air superiority by targeting and disabling Iranian air defense systems and preventing the Revolutionary Guard from using long-range missiles. This included intensive air and naval strikes using strategic bombers such as the B-1B, B-2, and B-52, in addition to stealth aircraft like the F-35 and F-22. These operations resulted in air dominance over the theater of operations, the destruction of several missile launch platforms and command and control centers, and attacks on media facilities and infrastructure linked to the political leadership.

This phase can be described as one in which the regime is stripped of its core military capabilities and its sources of power are reduced. Estimates in this scenario suggest that roughly 50 percent of these capabilities were damaged or neutralized, despite the Revolutionary Guard’s ability to adapt through concealment tactics and a decentralized command approach. At the same time, Iran sought to mobilize its allies and proxies in Iraq and Lebanon to alleviate direct military pressure and create some tactical maneuvering space.

This phase also saw indirect communications between Tehran and Washington through intelligence channels, in an attempt to explore the possibility of ending the war and accepting heavy losses in order to preserve what remained of the regime’s structure. However, this option faced rejection from Israel, which believed that returning to a scenario of rapid de-escalation would not achieve the objectives of the war and called for continued operations until regime change in Iran was realized. This stance leads to the most complex phase of the conflict: the potential execution of a ground operation requiring the deployment of forces on the ground with the goal of toppling the regime.

What are the possible scenarios for ground operations?

1-Precision operations deep inside Iran

In this scenario, the plan relies on using special forces and rapid response units such as Delta Force, Rangers, SEALs, and the Special Activities Unit to carry out rapid, precise direct-stripping operations deep inside Iran. This scenario minimizes casualties and limits prolonged military engagement, but it does not necessarily guarantee the complete toppling of the regime, though it could weaken it and lead to its eventual collapse.

These operations may include:

• Capturing Revolutionary Guard leaders and key political and ideological figures in important provinces such as Tehran, Hamedan, Qom, and other provinces of strategic Revolutionary Guard influence.

• Targeting and sabotaging or destroying remaining Revolutionary Guard command and control centers.

• Securing nuclear facilities in Natanz, Fordow, and Isfahan, along with other critical sites, for later neutralization or destruction.

• Conducting air or sea landings in specific areas and then withdrawing after achieving objectives.

2-Direct-stripping scenario

This scenario focuses on stripping the regime of its power bases and controlling Iran’s strategic outskirts rather than deep incursions into the interior. The goal is to gradually weaken the regime economically and militarily, potentially leading to internal collapse or a political settlement. This may include:

• Controlling key trade arteries on Iran’s western side facing the Gulf, including vital islands, ports, and the entire Strait of Hormuz.

• Establishing buffer zones near the borders with Azerbaijan, Iraq, and Iran’s southern coast.

• Cutting off supply lines.

3-Internal uprising support scenario

In this scenario, U.S. forces would not serve as the main ground force but rather play a supporting role for opposition groups within Iran. The goal is to topple the regime through internal pressure while minimizing the scale of direct military intervention.

This could include providing intelligence and logistical support to armed opposition forces, while maintaining air control to prevent the Revolutionary Guard and Basij from suppressing the opposition.

These scenarios are among the least costly options compared to others and align closely with the mindset of U.S. military decision-makers. They are likely to produce positive results given the current state of the Iranian regime, particularly its internal exhaustion and fissures, as well as the confusion and disarray in its decision-making processes. This may limit the regime’s ability to prolong the war or sustain prolonged confrontation.

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