Redefining Gulf security: Lessons from Iranian aggression
The day after in the Arab Gulf countries will be different from the day Iran began its aggression against these states, in violation of the principles of good neighborliness, the United Nations Charter, and international and humanitarian law. These countries exercised their right to defend their homelands without being drawn into full-scale war, for several reasons.
The challenge faced by the Gulf states certainly undermined trust between these countries and the Iranian regime. The end of the war is expected to open the way for two paths:
The first is the continued institutionalization of relations between the states, especially in the fields of defense and security.
The second is the development of a new security doctrine that would lead to a shift from the logic of “political and military coordination” to the logic of “practical collective security.”
This approach puts into practice the Gulf Cooperation Council’s declaration of March 1, 2026, that the security of its member states is “indivisible,” and that any attack on one member state is an attack on all, while maintaining the right to individual and collective self-defense in accordance with Article 51 of the United Nations Charter.
Iran as an Immediate Threat
The previous security doctrine in the Gulf regarded Iran as a neighbor posing an indirect threat. However, the Iranian aggression has overturned this notion, as Iran now represents a direct threat by targeting airports, ports, and energy and water infrastructure. It also poses a threat to societal stability through sleeper cells linked to the Revolutionary Guard.
Despite the high efficiency of defense systems in the Gulf countries, the scale and nature of the attacks have demonstrated the need to consolidate and institutionalize the concept of “collective Gulf security.”
Politically, Iran’s transformation into an adversary willing to target the Gulf on a large scale requires the GCC states to separate security matters from political differences and to unify their approach toward Iran.
Unifying this approach requires learning from the scope of threats and the lessons they provide. Tehran spared neither Qatar nor the Sultanate of Oman, disregarding their mediation efforts. Likewise, the Gulf states’ positions opposing war with Iran and their calls to the U.S. President to prioritize political solutions over military action had no protective effect.
Any future negotiations with Iran must be accompanied by a policy of “defensive deterrence,” which entails layered defenses, enhanced interception capabilities, fortified infrastructure, and a collective stance on freedom of navigation.
Priorities of the Gulf States
Whether the Arab Gulf countries participate in the anticipated U.S.-Iran negotiations to end the war or not, and whether the Iranian regime remains in power, changes, or collapses into chaos, the Gulf is facing multiple priorities and responsibilities at the level of practical defense and security policies.
After the war, it is likely that priorities will include establishing a truly unified Gulf-wide early warning and interception network, fortifying oil and gas facilities, ports, and airports as primary targets of war, and protecting maritime routes and freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb through broader collective arrangements. Additionally, there will be the need for a joint political, security, and legal response to the security cells created by the Revolutionary Guard in several Gulf countries to destabilize their security and stability. Discoveries so far in the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Bahrain provide clear evidence of the scale of the challenges ahead in this area.
In political terms, the Iranian aggression against the Gulf has offered these states an opportunity to redefine themselves in the fields of defense, security, and the economy.
Gulf awareness today of the need to capitalize on this shock is very high. It is crucial that building a solid economic-security bloc takes precedence over all differences and competition among the member states.
Redefining Gulf relations with both Turkey and Pakistan is a strategic issue that could enable the Gulf to achieve sustainable defensive deterrence against Iran’s future ambitions, regardless of the form of its regime or its doctrine. The Gulf Cooperation Council states have a historic opportunity to realize this transformation.
Professor of Political Science at the Lebanese University
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar
