In 1994, Egypt applied to join the Arab Maghreb Union, a move that stirred widespread debate about the goals of this sudden shift in Egypt's regional orientation, raising questions both within and outside the Union. Perhaps nowhere was the discussion louder than in Egypt itself. Many wondered whether it signaled a major shift away from Cairo's Eastern associations toward a strategic pivot to the Maghreb.

I recall meeting with Mr. Amr Moussa, Egypt's Foreign Minister at the time, at the end of a visit to Morocco, during which he was received by the late King Hassan II. I conducted an interview with him, which was published in the newspaper Al-Sharq Al-Awsat on December 8, 1994.

In that interview, Moussa emphasized that Egypt could not withdraw from the East under any circumstances and that the request to join was not a shift but an addition. He explained that Egypt did not deviate from its location, history, or geography, noting that the Maghreb Union's borders extended to Egypt's western frontier. He viewed everyone as part of a single geographical area and all as members of an Arab bloc. Therefore, engagement with the Maghreb Union did not necessarily require a rupture with any other bloc.

Moussa also mentioned that Egypt would maintain its membership in the Damascus Declaration and strengthen its ties with the Maghreb Union, all under the umbrella of the League of Arab States.

Egypt's desire to turn toward the Maghreb came after a notable statement made by Moussa at the beginning of 1993, in which he said that the Damascus Declaration was faltering nearly two years after its establishment in 1991. The new system, formed following the liberation of Kuwait, included the Gulf Cooperation Council states in addition to Egypt and Syria, both of which had participated in the alliance against Iraq.

However, the enthusiasm following Kuwait's liberation soon waned, as the Damascus Declaration stalled due to the non-implementation of military and security cooperation agreements—particularly regarding the deployment of Egyptian and Syrian forces in the Gulf states—and disagreements over financial costs, the nature of joint military leadership, and decision-making mechanisms within the new framework. Consequently, the Damascus Declaration system dissipated, along with the idea of forming a permanent Arab defense system.

Returning to Egypt's desire to join the Maghreb Union, this step raised further questions, particularly given the stalemate the Union faced because of existing disagreements among its five members, especially between Morocco and Algeria over the Western Sahara conflict.

Moussa did not see these disputes as an obstacle to Egypt joining the Maghreb space. He was convinced that if every organization or group were judged solely by the state of its relations and crises, then the United Nations, NATO, the European Union, and the Arab League would all have been dissolved. Thus, he believed that nothing prevented Egypt from contributing positively, with all its might, within the Maghreb framework.

The Damascus Declaration blew away like the wind, and the Arab Maghreb Union became entangled in a maze, yet Egypt, under Hosni Mubarak, remained determined to pursue the idea of joining the Maghreb bloc.

In this context, the late Mohamed Benaissa, former Moroccan Foreign Minister, recounted that his Egyptian counterpart, Amr Moussa, contacted him by phone in the final years of King Hassan II's reign, requesting that he convey an oral message from President Mubarak to the Moroccan monarch, expressing Egypt's desire to become an observer member of the Maghreb Union.

The message reached King Hassan II, who told Minister Benaissa: "Tell your friend that Morocco will work to make Egypt a full member of the Maghreb Union, not just an observer," adding that he would persuade Libyan Colonel Muammar Gaddafi to agree so that he would not oppose Egypt's desire.

King Hassan II passed away, and with him, the Egyptian Maghreb dream faded. The Maghreb system entered a state of clinical death after the failure to hold the Maghreb summit in Tripoli on May 25, 2005, following many years without convening, after Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika declared that he would not forget the "Western Sahara" issue and intended to bring it up on the summit’s agenda, even though its inclusion had not been agreed upon.

Nevertheless, hope remains to breathe life back into this aborted union, with the prospect of finding a solution to the Western Sahara dispute within the framework of Moroccan sovereignty. The train of autonomy has finally departed from Madrid, and it is time to work toward the prosperity and well-being of the region stretching from Morocco to Egypt, even though the Libyan crisis could once again push the region into a grey zone, if not a dark one.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.