Nearly every country in the Middle East—from Turkiyë to the Gulf, and from Egypt to Pakistan—is interested in mediating and directing an agreement between Washington and Tehran. Apart from Israel, regional countries do not want a new war in the Middle East.

While Tehran signals flexibility and readiness for unprecedented concessions in its nuclear program, it reluctantly absorbs information from envoys that President Donald Trump is ready to start a new war. America’s “armada,” amassed in the region’s waters, will not withdraw before achieving objectives that are growing by the day and at times seem to include the absolute dismantling of the regime.

Tehran has realized how profoundly the world has changed from the period preceding the signing of the Vienna nuclear agreement in 2015, during the presidency of former U.S. President Barack Obama. At that time, Washington brokered understandings with Tehran through a Muscat back channel and imposed an agreement over the heads of the region’s leadership, often without consulation.

Obama left office in 2016, justifying the move as inevitable and advising Gulf countries to share influence in the region with Iran. From that agreement, Tehran derived financial resources, a sense of arrogance, a ballistic missile program, and an extensive network of arms and proxies. Eleven years later, under Donald Trump, Washington appears more attentive to its regional partners and more convinced that no agreement can succeed without a supportive regional environment.

The region does not want war, nor does it support a collapse of the Tehran regime. It cannot prevent the United States from waging its war, but it will not be a willing partner, publicly disavowing the use of its territory in strikes on Iranian targets. At the same time, the region will not permit a new deal to be pushed through as a purely bilateral arrangement between Washington and Tehran. Washington, seeking maximum concessions, may not want this limited outcome either, and Tehran, hoping to ignore regional grievances, would be lucky to achieve it.

It is no small matter that reports speak of representatives from some regional countries being present at the anticipated meeting between Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff. This presence appears to mark a break with the way the previous agreement was concluded and reflects changes in the world and shifts in regional power balances.

The region wants an agreement that brings an end to the Iranian exception that has defined the past decades since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Israel does not want a ballistic missile program whose dangers it has already experienced. The countries of the region do not want militias proliferating across it, undermining security and stability.

Iran will not be ideologically prepared to make concessions to the region at the same level as the potential concessions it may offer the United States. Tehran will seek to ease tensions with Trump and may offer symbolic concessions that curb its nuclear ambitions. However, Iran will strive to preserve its exceptional status as endorsed by Obama eleven years ago, along with the illusion that portrays it as a dominant regional power.

The countries of the region need a U.S.–Iranian agreement that brings an end to the phase of chaos they have endured for decades. They seek an agreement that sets a clear ceiling on the Iranian illusions fostered by previous U.S. administrations. It is no longer acceptable for Iran and its militias to threaten Gulf security, Yemen’s unity, Iraq’s stability, Lebanon’s sovereignty, or Syria’s independence. While it may be unrealistic to expect Iran to accept living its daily life as a normal state with a conventional understanding of politics and international relations, Tehran is requesting that negotiations be moved from Ankara to Muscat, perhaps clinging to memories of the city that hosted understandings with Obama. Yet no city in the region will be able to avert a fate that the world, East and West alike, may decide upon to end the Iranian stalemate.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.