Christians, particularly the Maronites, often make a serious mistake in their competition for the presidency by turning it into a deadly internal conflict. Their divisions and infighting leave them vulnerable to infiltration, sometimes resulting in the election of a president who does not reflect their broader consensus. This inevitably sparks complaints and demands to resist perceived marginalization. Yet when they do achieve unity, they are often able to impose a president whom others reluctantly accept—though their agreement does not always serve the national interest first, or even the Christian interest second.

Christians also make a mistake by failing to unite around the leading Christian position—not just in Lebanon, but across the Arab world. This is especially significant given that the ‘Charter’ arrangement reserves the presidency for the Maronites, along with other top state positions, while in many neighboring countries—where the Christian population is numerically larger—appointing a minister or parliamentarian remains far more difficult.

The pressing question is whether Christians—particularly the Maronites—have themselves weakened the presidency, and whether they continue down the same path, allowing personal disputes, interests, and ambitions to take precedence.

It is not easy for Christians to pose—and answer—this question candidly, because the presidency is more than a political or administrative office. While the president may appear to preside, the role carries a historical weight and existential significance. Yet any serious discussion of the presidency’s crisis cannot simply blame others; it requires honest introspection.

Christians have contributed to weakening the presidency—and their broader political position—through a long history of divisions and poor management of their political role. Deep internal rifts, often escalating into leadership conflicts without competing projects, ideas, or visions, have stripped the presidency of its natural role as a unifying reference. When Christians disagree over the presidency before external actors do, the position becomes vulnerable and easy to undermine. Numerous examples illustrate this pattern, including the current divisions among major Christian factions—at times severing communication, spreading animosity, and engaging in electronic battles that follow earlier political and strategic cancellations. This includes the lack of support for President Joseph Aoun from two of the largest Christian groups, the Lebanese Forces and the Free Patriotic Movement, and previously, the isolation of President Michel Aoun, who abandoned earlier agreements amid changing circumstances, leaving President Michel Sleiman exposed to external pressures. Perhaps this fragmentation has pushed presidents, ministers, and parliamentarians to seek the "shelter of others," as exemplified by former Deputy Speaker Elias Ferzli, who came to realize that his "supposed" parliamentary seat now depends on such protection.

Conversely, it would be unfair to reduce the crisis to the phrase "Christians weakened their presidency," as multiple internal and external factors are intertwined. The selectively applied Taif Agreement, which stripped the presidency of key powers without completing state-building through effective checks and institutions, has also contributed to weakening both the presidency and Lebanon’s overall position.

However, when Christians withhold—not blindly offer—support for the presidency, they reduce the president, regardless of who holds the office, to little more than a pawn in a broader game of obstruction.

Christians’ review of their role cannot succeed without the involvement of other partner communities in the country. At the same time, it is essential to strengthen and repair their internal structure, moving toward a comprehensive national reassessment that restores the presidency’s value—not as a sectarian privilege, but as a cornerstone of a state that cannot function without a fully empowered head or a partnership that lacks completeness.

In conclusion, I remember being contacted one day by an advisor to President Michel Aoun, asking if I had any objection to meeting the president the following Monday. I replied, "Why reduce the presidency to such an extent? Every Lebanese citizen, regardless of differing viewpoints, should not be asked for consent to meet their president, but invited—or even summoned—with the dignity the Office deserves. That is precisely what I intend to do next Monday."

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.