Since the establishment of Israel in 1948, Syria has been perceived in Israeli political thought as a major challenge, considering geographical, security, and political aspects, as well as its cultural and social influences. This perception is reinforced by the fact that the Palestinian people are part of the Levantine societies in various ways. Moreover, Syria has been regarded as a key country in the Arab East, especially if some form of integration or cooperation were to occur between it and Egypt or Iraq. Israel has consistently sought to prevent such developments in every possible way.

In reality, Syria has always been an active player in Middle Eastern politics. It participated in all Arab-Israeli wars and served as a host for resistance factions, first in the Palestinian phase and later in the Palestinian-Lebanese phase. It also acted as a conduit for Iranian support to Hezbollah in Lebanon, in addition to its dominance over Lebanon for three decades from 1976 to 2005.

It should be noted that during the rule of the Assad regime, both the father and the son, Syria, despite its slogans and posturing, remained restrained within the limits of the Arab-Israeli conflict. It maintained the stance that the 1973 war was the last war against Israel and prevented any operations by Palestinian factions, and later Lebanese factions, from its borders. Although it boycotted the Sadat regime because of the Camp David Agreement, it did not break with the peace process. Syria later normalized relations with Egypt under President Hosni Mubarak and participated in the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991, as well as in bilateral negotiations with Israel.

Another important observation is that the main concern of the Assad regime, especially the father, was to strengthen the authority of the state both internally and externally and to secure the stability of the ruling institution centered around the family. For this reason, Syria adhered to its limits, while at the same time using Palestinian, Lebanese, and Iranian influence to enhance its position regionally and internationally, particularly in relation to the United States.

This explains why the Syrian regime was extremely strong, harsh, and oppressive internally and in its neighborhood, while in dealings with the United States and Israel, it was fragile, cautious, and flexible. For example, it only entered Lebanon with the consent of the United States and Israel, and it followed the same pattern, even symbolically, in participating with the United States in the invasion of Iraq in 2003.

What has been discussed explains Israel’s cautious stance toward any international intervention in Syrian affairs during the outbreak of the Syrian revolution. Israel argued that the existing regime was better known than any alternative, especially since Israel’s border with Syria had long been considered its quietest border with any neighboring country. This was accompanied by the promotion of the idea that “Arabs are killing Arabs, let them kill each other,” which allowed the Syrian regime to continue its oppression, destroy infrastructure, and displace nearly half of the Syrian population as refugees and internally displaced persons, all in full view of the world, unlike interventions in other countries.

The implication is that Israel had been very reassured by the prevailing regime in Damascus. However, the moment of the “Al-Aqsa Flood” operation changed these calculations. Previously, Israel had invested in the Assad regime and in Iranian policies aimed at undermining state and social structures in Arab countries of the Levant. This operation occurred at a time when Russia and Iran, Syria’s partners and protectors, were preoccupied—Russia with Ukraine and Iran trying to avoid confrontation with the United States—creating the objective conditions for the overthrow and eventual collapse of the Assad regime.

Nonetheless, Israel wasted no time. It quickly violated Syrian sovereignty, attacked its territory, and destroyed the infrastructure of the Syrian army, revealing how reassured it had been by the previous regime. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was among the first to issue both theoretical and practical threats to Syria, while trying to sow internal division by promoting the protection of minorities and calling for the withdrawal of Syrian forces from southern provinces such as Sweida, Daraa, and Quneitra to secure Israel’s borders, a strategy also applied in Lebanon.

In practice, Israel’s actions toward Syria are not only aimed at restoring its army’s prestige and reaffirming its role as the strongest military power in the Middle East, thereby establishing a strategic security depth to prevent future “floods.” Israel also seeks to exploit social and political fissures within Syria and Lebanon, playing on divisions and seeking geographical or societal fragmentation to impose an older strategy. This strategy envisions an Arab Levant structured around sectarian and ethnic identities, which would eliminate Syria’s exceptionality as a Jewish state in the region. In other words, Israel is not trying to normalize itself with the Arab environment; rather, it is trying to normalize the Arab environment with itself, spreading its model throughout the region.

It is clear that Syria faces political, security, economic, and social challenges. However, its ability to confront these challenges depends on the new government’s capacity to restore the state as an institutionally sound, law-abiding entity with empowered citizens. Strengthening the Syrians’ sense of themselves as free, independent, and equal citizens is the essential condition for building a new Syria, fortifying it, and preventing Israel from dividing or weakening it.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar