The debate in Berlin is no longer about whether Germany needs to strengthen its intelligence capabilities, but about how and when the process can begin. Amid growing concerns in Europe that intelligence sharing could be used as political leverage, Germany now faces a pressing question: What if Washington chooses to scale back its security cooperation or use it as a bargaining tool?

The shock triggered by Washington’s decision to suspend information sharing with Ukraine in March 2025 was a revealing moment for European elites. It showed that American dominance in intelligence gathering could be used as an instrument of geopolitical leverage. For Berlin, which depends heavily on American technical and satellite capabilities as well as communications intercepts, it served as a strategic wake-up call.

The German external intelligence agency, the Federal Intelligence Service (BND), was founded in 1956 under strict legal constraints specifically designed to prevent a recurrence of Nazi-era abuses. These constraints, together with a cautious political culture toward surveillance tools, have shaped the agency’s focus on information gathering and analysis, without granting it broad offensive executive powers. However, this approach—rooted in a painful historical experience—has gradually become a vulnerability in a security environment increasingly defined by cyber and hybrid threats.

The German government, led by Friedrich Merz, is pursuing what could be described as an intelligence turning point, parallel to the military shift announced after the Russia-Ukraine war. Increasing the budget, expanding authorities, and permitting the use of artificial intelligence tools and facial recognition technologies are intended to narrow the gap with partners—not to sever ties with Washington. The objective is not full independence—an unrealistic goal in the near term—but rather a reduction of strategic vulnerability.

However, the change will not be absolute; any expansion of powers will remain contingent upon the declaration of a special intelligence situation by the National Security Council within the Federal Chancellery, and parliamentary oversight will continue to play a central role in supervising such measures. These constraints reflect Germany’s enduring dilemma: how to strengthen security effectiveness without compromising fundamental rights or reviving the ghosts of the past?

Germany’s move could serve as a gateway to deeper intelligence cooperation within the European Union, particularly in response to potential Russian and cyber threats. Yet the absence of a unified European intelligence agency, along with the uneven capabilities among member states, positions Berlin to play a pivotal role.

Germany is seeking to redefine its security cooperation with Washington. While the transatlantic relationship will remain a cornerstone of European security, Berlin aims to move from being an almost exclusive recipient of intelligence to becoming a partner capable of making meaningful contributions. The success of this course will depend on the adoption of legal reforms, public acceptance in Germany of a stronger intelligence agency, and the direction of future U.S. policies.