Returning to 1970s Iraq, it is hardly a question whether the country's trajectory was stunted by Saddam Hussein. In those years of party negligence, the deeply suspicious then-vice president succeeded in monopolizing the security services and turning them on his foes. In his early years, Saddam navigated a largely-impotent Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party, finding his footing in hard power, when much of the party was content with hollow, naive statements about Palestine and national glory.

Pre-Saddam Iraq was a promising and inspiring country—a state of genuine human and material development with solid foundations. Free education, widespread literacy, modern farms and factories, a cohesive infrastructure, and essential services were all in place, alongside a semi-functioning market economy and notable increases in per-capita income.

There is no denying that the seven years between 1973 and 1979 were the golden era in the history of both the Iraqi state and its society. Even as the state imposed restrictions on personal freedom and intellectual expression, it succeeded in providing stability, alleviating poverty and forming a secular, modern character for Iraq which, in theory meant to accommodate Iraq's  diverse ways of living. Among its successes, the state banned the use of tribal titles, hoping to elevate the poor and leave former divisions behind.

That same Iraq witnessed the unprecedented empowerment of security institutions, which in due time, Saddam would use as the striking force to protect "the revolution" and himself from external conspiracies.

From 1973, it became clear that Saddam Hussein’s narrative of conspiracy—used to control the party and pave his path to absolute power—would shape Iraq’s entire trajectory. This began with the elimination of Nazim Kazzar’s alleged conspiracy and culminated in the extermination of half the party leadership, including Mohammed Ayash, Adnan Hussein, and Mohammed Mahjoub, all under the pretense of coordinating with Hafez al-Assad to overthrow the regime.

While  Iraqis were dazzled by the luxuries of Western consumer goods, stories existed on the margins of tragedies, forced disappearances of political figures, imagined conspiracies forcefully snuffed out. In the lead up to the 1979 split with the Communist Party, the disappearances intensified and the lucky few fled the country—some through organized channels with the former Soviet Union, others chaotically, often at the mercy of party operatives.

When Saddam officially assumed the state’s top position in 1979, Iraq entered a period defined by war, first against Iran and later against American-led coalitions for two decades. The man, who had never served as a soldier, attained the rank of “Marshal."

Bad Luck and Collective Blindness

Iraqis have been deprived of lasting, true happiness for centuries. In the 1970s, it seemed as if the gates of fortune had finally opened. This might have been true—if only Saddam Hussein had not seized absolute power without party oversight.

Saddam Hussein masked events behind the eight-year war. No one paid attention to the fate of the state, as Iraq sank to its lowest point—a country of citizens living on slogans, waiting for their leader’s word of salvation. This led to a form of collective blindness that ultimately culminated in the disaster of the Kuwait invasion.

We call it bad luck that, 23 years after the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime, Iraqis still remain unsure of who truly governs them—as if they have learned nothing from those bitter years. It is as though their state remains embryonic, preventing the full expression of their national identity.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.