President Joseph Aoun’s assertion that the specter of a wide-scale Israeli strike on Lebanon has effectively become unlikely remains a focal point for observers, despite several days having passed since he made it. This stance is based on recent indications that Lebanon has been granted a kind of “grace period” and another postponement.

It is evident that these assurances have largely dispelled a wave of fear that gripped Lebanese citizens over the past three months due to direct Israeli threats, as well as messages conveyed by Arab and foreign envoys to Beirut, urging serious consideration of these threats and demanding Hezbollah to show flexibility and commit to disarming.

There is no doubt that Aoun’s reassurances had an impact, particularly given his reputation for consistently making responsible statements as part of his effort to maintain a measured and serious approach. Nonetheless, doubts persisted for two reasons: first, Israel deliberately continued its threats against Lebanon, coupled with on-the-ground escalation that at times exceeded familiar thresholds; and second, the expectations built around the anticipated meeting between Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and U.S. President Donald Trump, which had been presented as a meeting that would chart a final course for the region, specifically Gaza and Lebanon.

However, the wave of uncertainty that accompanied that meeting soon receded in the hours that followed, especially after diplomats conveyed to relevant parties in Beirut that Trump and Netanyahu had implicitly agreed, at this stage, to keep Lebanon out of any strike directed at Iran or any war that might erupt alongside it. Naturally, this revived confidence in President Aoun’s assurances.

Accordingly, analysts also revisited an assessment that had emerged recently, suggesting that Israel is dealing with the “core,” namely Iran, before moving to eliminate its proxies, particularly its main proxy in Lebanon, “Hezbollah.” This is based on a new equation that has begun to take hold, the essence of which is that Iran is a ripe fruit ready to be picked, for two reasons: first, Tel Aviv must capitalize on the results of its initial war against Iran; and second, the bet on the outcomes of the ongoing popular movement inside Iran, especially if the authorities continue to fail to suppress or absorb it.

Analysts have also focused in recent hours on the Israeli cabinet meeting that was held immediately after Netanyahu’s return. They were surprised by Israeli reports stating explicitly that the participants ignored discussion of the anticipated Israeli move toward Lebanon. This suggested the existence of an operational decision to keep Israel’s measures toward Lebanon at their usual pace, while concentrating efforts on the future of the situation in Iran, which is currently volatile.

Some also place, within the same context, the postponement of expected visits to Beirut by envoys, foremost among them French envoy Jean-Yves Le Drian and Saudi envoy Yazid bin Farhan.

Nevertheless, Hezbollah views the argument that Lebanon can be kept out of any potential regional confrontation, on condition that the party refrains from military escalation, as part of an Israeli campaign of intimidation and pressure against Lebanon, and against the party in particular. This is because Hezbollah is seen as the actor that could move to support Iran, just as it previously supported Gaza. Such an approach means the party is being placed under scrutiny and constant observation.

Overall, the party is monitoring a phase of regional “reshuffling of cards” that has emerged in the wake of events in Venezuela and on the eve of renewed threats of a strike against Iran.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar