The question in the headline serves as an entry point to understanding a structural crisis striking the center of decision making in Tehran. The divergence between statements from the presidency, the Foreign Ministry, and the Revolutionary Guard has become routine, revealing that power does not move from a single center but from a competing network where security doctrine intersects with political survival calculations.

Iran has clear constitutional institutions: the presidency, parliament, the Assembly of Experts, the Guardian Council, and the Expediency Council. But this structure, at present, does not necessarily mean there is a coherent leadership. Decision making passes through unequal power centers, led by the Revolutionary Guard as the most influential actor and the one most firmly in control of security, the military, and its regional proxies.

The multiplicity of institutions organizing governance in the country is not new. What is new is the contradiction in the signals they produce. Abbas Araghchi announces that the Strait of Hormuz is open and safe for navigation. The Revolutionary Guard responds with a threatening stance backed by its swarm fleet.

The disagreement is no longer just a difference in wording. It reflects a struggle over who has the authority to define Iran’s position itself. Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf defends negotiations, only to face attacks from hardliners operating under the umbrella and protection of the Guard. This is the image of a republic governed by the doctrine of the Supreme Jurist that has lost its guardian, with no clear successor, and now speaks with multiple voices.

An absent head of state

The crisis reaches its peak in the debate over the negotiating delegation to Islamabad. Signs of diplomatic flexibility coincided with implicit accusations that the delegation, which included more than 80 people, had overstepped its authority. The facts suggest that the negotiations do not reflect a final decision or a clear state policy. The process appears more like an internal testing ground where the limits of influence are being drawn between two camps: one favoring negotiation and agreement, the other confrontation and escalation. In both cases, the objective follows the instinct of survival.

The new supreme leader Mojtaba Khamenei is absent. The republic has lost the key mechanism of balance that Khomeini created and that Khamenei the elder skillfully managed. The Revolutionary Guard has taken control as the dominant force in both time and place, and it is expected to assume the primary role after long acting as a subsidiary force and guardian of an expanding revolution.

Iran most likely overestimated its own power and believed too much in its dominance, failing to prepare in its good days for the difficult ones. It has moved from an era of permanence to a temporary and transitional phase. History shows that fractures in the life of nations create rare opportunities for the stronger side to seize. Hard power, represented by the Guard, conservatives, and hardliners, is advancing, while soft power, represented by the government, the presidency, and diplomacy and communication channels, is receding.

It will be difficult to imagine reaching a meaningful agreement when the world does not know who governs Iran. Any potential settlement appears fragile even before the parties find their way to it. Its implementation would be open to interpretation, dispute, and reversal, and could easily be undermined even after it is signed. Who would protect the details from their hidden pitfalls? Washington realizes it is facing a dilemma it did not anticipate when it celebrated depriving Iran of its leader and senior commanders.

A fragmented leadership

We now understand why Washington dropped its conditions on addressing the missile program and severing the ties between Iran and its regional proxies. Donald Trump now appears to want a partial outcome limited to neutralizing the nuclear program, in hopes of returning to Americans, as he promised, with a better result than that achieved by his predecessor Barack Obama, whom he opposed.

Iran, having lost the leverage of the Strait of Hormuz, now seems to take pride in a new and striking card: the claim that it has no unified leadership and that its positions are fragmented. This situation concerns not only Washington but also countries across the region, which fear a force that has raged for decades and now appears without restraint or a leader to contain it.

Statements of de-escalation and apology from Masoud Pezeshkian or Abbas Araghchi are met with actions and escalation by the Revolutionary Guard. Gulf states may deal with Iran as a power capable of negotiation but unable to control all its instruments. The world has come to understand that Iran does not have a single decision that represents the state. In this context, Tehran chose not to attend Islamabad, while Washington opted not to resume the war until a fragmented Iran arrives at a clear decision.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.