Logically, the preliminary US-Iranian talks for last-chance negotiations should not collapse, as both delegations expected the other to raise the bar before arriving in Islamabad, leaving room for negotiation maneuvering. There has not yet been a radical breakthrough in US-Iran relations, but there is a semblance of acknowledgment from Donald Trump's administration of the legitimacy of the Revolutionary Guard's rule, no matter how much Donald Trump tries to depict the new regime members as rational, claiming that US military operations resulted in a regime change in Tehran.

Monetary gain has become a shared goal between Washington under Trump and Tehran’s Revolutionary Guard. What is new and intriguing—and concerning—is that the US president has spoken of an Iranian-American partnership to generate revenue through the Strait of Hormuz, before later retracting to consider the consequences of such an idea for US allies in the Gulf and the broader Middle East, as well as for European allies.

It is noteworthy that talk of an Iranian-American partnership in managing the Strait of Hormuz has stirred the aspirations of the Revolutionary Guard—not out of any affection for what it calls the “Great Satan,” but because such a controversial idea positions the Islamic Republic of Iran as a major global power in the Middle East. Secondly, such a partnership would undermine the strategic alliance between the United States and the Gulf Arab states.

Thirdly, because a partnership between the American “devil,” in Tehran’s view, and the “terrorist” regime, in Washington’s view, would lay the groundwork for redrawing the Middle East’s map by merging Persian nationalism’s hegemony with American nationalism’s superiority, while turning toward the hegemony of Jewish nationalism in Israel, and deliberately marginalizing Arab regional visions and development projects, particularly in the Gulf states.

The Tehran officials may claim that they have succeeded in drawing America closer to their position and in creating discord within the American-Israeli alliance, thereby justifying both overt and covert deals they have in mind. They aim to lay the groundwork for agreements that would help them remain in power and secure substantial financial gains.

The Tehran officials are betting on Donald Trump’s ability to compel some Gulf Cooperation Council states to pay the compensation bill that Iran demands, basing their thinking on the premise that the common denominator between Iran and Israel is the reduction of Arab influence in the Middle East. They seek to revive a historical conciliatory relationship between Persians and Jews as part of a strategy for shaping a new Middle East.

Most Gulf Arab leaders have preempted surprises and arbitrary actions by building relationships with China, Russia, and Europe in preparation for such scenarios. However, the relationship with the United States remains a strategic foundation for Gulf Arab states, despite their efforts to diversify ties. Today, these countries find themselves in a necessary period of reassessment in light of a potential American-Iranian reshuffling of the balance of power and the possibility of further Iranian retaliation if the qualitative shift in US-Iran relations fails after the Islamabad meeting.

The Iranian delegation to the Islamabad talks was led by Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, the man who oversaw the violent crackdown on protesters in Iran, whom Donald Trump promised to support. Trump can tell them that he has shattered Iran’s military capabilities, crushed the top leadership of Iran in partnership with Israel, and reduced the regime’s ability to continue oppression, thereby easing the possibility of regime change.

But the temptations of money and American recognition of the legitimacy of the ruling figures in Tehran could lead the new regime’s leaders to adapt here and there. They are skilled in the arts of procrastination and the bazaar.

They may offer minor concessions with significant media impact in the nuclear field, enabling Donald Trump to claim victory and justify the war’s motives.

They might agree to cosmetic adjustments regarding ballistic missiles, but not concerning drones.

And they will not sacrifice their proxies and militias in Iraq, Lebanon, and Yemen, unless the Trump administration seriously and decisively conditions any agreement on the dismantling of these militias, rather than merely urging Tehran to reduce its funding and arming of them. Otherwise, any perceived Iranian cooperation on the issue of proxies would amount only to transitional arrangements, not a fundamental change in the core doctrine.

The Tehran regime was compelled to back away from this condition due to successful American diplomacy, which initiated US mediation for direct negotiations between the State of Lebanon and Israel toward a ceasefire and peace.

The Lebanese state’s decision to secure Beirut was necessary, and it deserves encouragement and support for the Lebanese army to carry out its duties in the capital without fear or intimidation from Hezbollah, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, or certain Lebanese political leaders.

In other words, the US must not fail to force Iran to completely abandon its strategy of arms, proxies, and militias, as they are illegitimate. If the Trump administration treats this doctrine as secondary, considering that it should not be insisted upon in order to ensure the success of negotiations, it would be making the same critical strategic error that former President Barack Obama made, which brought us to where we are now.

President Trump is still not victorious in this war, and the Revolutionary Guard is still not defeated.