The noise of war is louder in Baghdad than in Tehran. It is no secret that Iraq’s situation is more fragile and less able to withstand a blow directed at Iran. Although Iraq has armed forces numbering over a million, it lacks the capacity to act as a direct participant in the war. A single strike could paralyze life there, especially given the fragmentation it has endured in terms of its sovereignty, particularly on economic and social levels.

This does not mean that the political system has not found in the war a way to escape its crisis, which is fundamentally rooted in its structure. After a brief tweet by Donald Trump, the political process experienced a blockage that now concerns the political class more than it did in the past.

After the U.S. administration signaled its position against forming any new government involving pro-Iran militias, President Trump sought to prevent Nouri al-Maliki, who previously led the Iraqi government for two terms (2006–2014), from obtaining a third term, despite being the only candidate supported by the ruling Coordination Framework alliance he heads.

As expected, Trump’s tweet shook the Iraqi political class, quickly exposing the emptiness of its political will and dividing its blocs into three groups. One group saw no benefit for Iraq in following Nouri al-Maliki if it meant facing U.S. economic sanctions. Another considered Trump’s tweet as interference in internal affairs and a violation of national sovereignty. The third group viewed appointing someone close to al-Maliki as a solution that could satisfy both sides, a compromise through which a third party could protect its interests in Iraq—Iran.

A settlement that will take time

When the war between Israel and the U.S. on one side and Iran on the other erupted, Iraq became one of the war’s fronts—not because it chose to join the conflict, but because the warring parties have strategic interests there that cannot be ignored. These interests are part of the extensions reaching into the soft areas of the so-called new Middle East, where Iran, according to Russian analyses, hoped to play a role in shaping the region’s future and positioning itself as a major power capable of rivaling Israel’s ambitions.

Iraq is little more than a minor detail in a war primarily aimed at Iran. While it is true that pro-Iran militias in Iraq have independently targeted U.S. bases and interests without the government’s consent, it is also true that the government is too weak to stop these militias from dragging the country into the conflict. Because the government must act largely in line with the Coordination Framework alliance, it became clear that its response to Trump’s tweet would highlight not only its inability to control the aggressive militias but also its failure to prevent mobilization campaigns—ranging from volunteering to fight and donating gold and funds, to sending convoys of food-laden trucks to Iran, despite there being no food crisis there.

There was a need for Iraq’s ruling political system to be involved in the war, based on the belief that it would be included in any resolution of the conflict if Iran emerged recognized as a major player in shaping the future regional landscape.

The Popular Mobilization Forces state exists

All available evidence in Iraqi politics confirms that the ruling political class in Iraq miscalculated when it placed its fate—and that of the country—into the hands of the Popular Mobilization Forces. Formally part of the Iraqi armed forces, the PMF is in reality a powerful extension of Iran within Iraq. Yet, calling this a “mistake” may unfairly lend a moral aura to a political class that does not deserve it, as its members are all, in one way or another, followers of the militias that make up the Popular Mobilization Forces.

After 2021, the Iraqi state shifted from the control of religious parties to that of the Popular Mobilization Forces, enabling Hadi al‑Amiri, leader of the Iran-backed and loyal Badr Organization, to threaten the Shiite prime minister appointed by the Coordination Framework with dismissal if he considered distancing Iraq from the war.

Thus, it can be said that Iraq’s political class is little more than a peripheral component, serving to give the misleading impression of democratic political life in a country where Qassem Soleimani managed relations among the ruling parties before he was killed in 2020 on Baghdad Airport Road. The location of his death is also symbolic, highlighting the reach of his sphere of influence.

Since U.S. forces withdrew from Iraq in 2011, it was expected that the country would fall under Iranian influence. Since then, Iran has manipulated Iraq’s financial, political, social, and economic assets to suit its own interests. This is evident in mobilization campaigns that turn a state—whose politicians occasionally admit their inability to pay public employees’ salaries—into a tool serving a state striving to become a nuclear power. The irony underscores that sectarian imagination has long outweighed reality and continues to do so.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.