A report published by Reuters on March 17 stated that Washington is pressuring Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa to consider deploying Syrian forces in Lebanon to help confront Hezbollah, a task that the Lebanese state has failed to accomplish for years. Although U.S. envoy Tom Barrack denied these claims, they highlighted a central challenge in the evolving bilateral relationship between the two countries.

Syria under al-Sharaa shows willingness to partner in efforts to contain Iranian influence and promote regional stability. However, it does not appear ready to act as an expeditionary force to confront pro-Iranian armed groups and disarm them outside its sovereign borders, whether in relation to Hezbollah in Lebanon or Shiite militias in Iraq. In this context, the Trump administration has significant room to ease tensions by acknowledging the constraints that shape the work of the emerging government in Damascus, as well as exploring alternative measures to enhance cooperation on key security issues.

So far, Damascus has adopted a cautious and calculated approach to the conflict, aligning diplomatically with Arab states and Washington, strengthening its border security, and avoiding escalation. At the same time, it has remained vigilant regarding Israel, whose forces attacked southern Syria on March 20 in support of Druze elements, and expanded its operations to enhance cooperation on issues in neighboring Lebanon. This cooperation reflects caution due to the structural limitations faced by a government that is still in the process of building and establishing itself.

On the diplomatic front, Foreign Minister Asaad al-Sheibani conducted a series of contacts with the United States in the Gulf, Turkey, and Western capitals immediately after hostilities erupted on February 28. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs condemned the attacks on Arab countries, expressing solidarity with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and Jordan. In the following days, al-Sharaa reinforced this message through direct communication with regional leaders, namely the Gulf leaders, and coordination with officials in Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government.

Syria had joined the Gulf Cooperation Council countries and Jordan in strongly condemning the Iranian strikes. This clearly placed Damascus within an emerging Arab bloc, yet at the same time it maintained restraint in its military posture and focused on securing its own territory. On March 3, Syria deployed thousands of troops, armored vehicles, and short-range missile systems along its borders. One report indicated that the deployed units included elite Uzbek and Uyghur elements integrated into the Syrian armed forces. This highlights transformations in the army’s combat structure and the continued reliance on foreign fighters, some of whom may hold extremist ideologies.

Syrian officials emphasized that these deployments were defensive in nature. Their mission was to combat infiltration and prevent the smuggling of drugs and weapons by Hezbollah and other Shiite militias. They were not part of any broader deterrent posture. It was confirmed that Syrian territory would not be used as a platform for confrontation. In this context, ongoing internal security requirements underscore a fundamental fact: a government still preoccupied with securing its domestic front is not in a position to open a new front in Lebanon or Iraq.

Any Syrian intervention in Lebanon carries serious risks under current conditions and could have implications for Washington’s regional strategy. Syrian involvement could quickly escalate beyond local skirmishes with networks to provoke retaliatory responses across Syria, Iraq, and beyond. It could inflame sectarian dynamics in Lebanon and across the Levant. Some actors would likely frame it under the banner of "resistance" and portray Syrian forces as targeting Shiite civilians. Syrian intervention could also undermine the legitimacy of the Lebanese state amid rising pressures to disarm Hezbollah. Given Syria’s harsh three-decade-long occupation of Lebanon, any new military intervention would likely be viewed as foreign coercion, with a high probability of backfiring.

Rather than considering an expeditionary role beyond its borders, the actions of the Syrian government during the current crisis point to a strategy that includes the following:

• Damascus seeks to prevent the consequences of the war from spilling into Syrian territory. This explains its increasing reinforcements along the border with Lebanon.

• Damascus aims to maintain a publicly visible political alignment with Arab countries and Washington, though this does not extend to Israel. There appears to be a desire to reposition Syria within the regional framework after years of Iranian influence and the presence of its militias.

• Damascus is keen to address and manage internal pressures cautiously. The war with Iran carries economic repercussions, strains on energy supplies, and anticipatory surges in fuel purchases.

What are the implications for U.S. policy? First, it confirms that Syrian military intervention in Lebanon is not expected at this time. Even anticipating such action creates dangerous incentives and miscalculations for all relevant actors. Second, the United States should support Syria’s efforts to secure its borders, enhance control, and prevent smuggling and infiltration. The Trump administration must take firmer measures regarding militias in Iraq. Third, it should work to integrate Syria into a broader regional framework to contain Iran. This includes coordination with European partners and Lebanon during the current conflict and afterward, covering issues such as the flow of Islamist militants, humanitarian assistance, and post-war reconstruction.

Syria’s geographic position makes it a strategic regional point even if it is not a fighting party on the front lines. Finally, U.S. policy should avoid overburdening the relationship with demands beyond Syria’s capabilities. Pressuring Syria excessively could destabilize it and open the door to a resurgence of ISIS and other groups.

Finally, any alignment with Syria remains fragile and conditional, reflecting intersecting interests more than a formal alliance. While the idea of turning Syria under al-Sharaa into a proxy force against Hezbollah may seem theoretically appealing, it is highly risky in practice and offers limited returns. The Syrian government is neither militarily nor politically equipped for such a role and encouraging it could hinder the regional order the United States seeks to establish.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.