Since the establishment of the Arab League in 1945, waves of skepticism about the usefulness of this institution have persisted; at times, they have escalated into calls for its abolition or for withdrawal from it. However, despite their clamor, these calls have never materialized into genuine sovereign decisions, which reveals from the outset that the issue is not merely about the performance of an institution, but is tied to the nature of the Arab political system itself, which generates and recycles this debate without allowing it to reach its logical conclusion.

With every regional crisis, the accusation resurfaces that the Arab League is an incapable or weak entity. However, this claim overlooks a fundamental structural reality: the League was not originally established as a supra-national authority, but rather as a coordinating framework that reflects the will of its members and is not independent of it. Therefore, assessing it apart from this foundation creates an artificial separation between the decision and its maker, blaming the instrument for what the political will chooses—or fails—to do. This criticism has recently intensified against the backdrop of the conflict involving Iran, the United States, and Israel, as well as the Iranian attacks on Gulf countries, which, according to Gulf Arab elites, elicited an inadequate response from the Arab League.

This situation also coincided with the end of Mr. Ahmed Aboul Gheit’s tenure as Secretary-General of the League and the nomination of Mr. Nabil Fahmy as his successor, amid ongoing Iranian aggressions against Gulf countries. This has widely reignited debates about the usefulness of the League’s continuity and the funds allocated to it, despite the fact that Fahmy’s nomination was approved unanimously by all Arab League member states.

Confusion between role and capability

Here, the clear confusion between role and capability becomes evident: the League does not govern the Arab states, but represents them. If the states themselves are divided or incapable of forming a collective stance, then the resulting limitations on the institution’s performance are normal, not exceptional. Consequently, criticisms of the League’s “failure” often appear more like an attempt to find a convenient scapegoat to blame for realities it cannot control.

Perhaps the most telling example of this was the decision to transfer the Arab League's headquarters to Tunisia in 1979. It is considered one of the swiftest decisions in the League’s history, coming in the wake of Egypt signing the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty that same year. An extraordinary summit was convened in Baghdad, called by Iraq, on March 27, 1979, amid a highly charged political atmosphere, resulting in the decision to freeze Egypt's membership and relocate the League's headquarters to Tunisia in record time. This episode reflects the Arab regimes’ capacity for rapid action when political will exists, even if the decision carries a severe punitive character.

However, Egypt rejected the decision, seeing it as a manifestation of political disagreement that did not undermine the legitimacy of its regional role. It maintained that its choices were sovereign and not subject to imposition, treating the move as a temporary measure dictated by an exceptional moment—an assessment later validated when Egypt eventually returned to its position within the Arab framework.

However, the paradox that cannot be ignored is that this capacity for rapid decision-making was not accompanied by any ability to build a more cohesive Arab system. On the contrary, this period coincided with an unprecedented escalation of crises, from the Iran-Iraq war to the invasion of Beirut, the rise of non-state actors like "Hezbollah," and the emergence of alternative regional frameworks such as the Gulf Cooperation Council. This demonstrates that the ability to make swift decisions does not necessarily equate to possessing a collective project capable of enduring.

The Arab League’s crisis can be traced to several structural factors, chief among them the absence of a concept of shared sovereignty. There has been no genuine will to delegate substantial powers to a regional institution akin to the European Union. This is compounded by differing definitions of threat and national security among Arab states, as well as the emergence of sub-regional blocs, reflecting a tendency toward more homogeneous, though narrower, alternatives.

In light of all this, the Arab League’s crisis appears less as an institutional failure than as a systemic one, stemming from an overarching system that lacks a comprehensive project capable of producing consensus. The institution itself does not generate political will—it merely reflects it; when that will is absent, the League can only record this absence. This underscores the implication of the title: the problem is not that the League fails, but that its “failure” serves as a convenient narrative that absolves regimes of accountability. The institution is blamed, capitals evade criticism, and the entity is targeted, while the decisions that shaped it remain beyond reproach. Ultimately, the Arab League does not seem so much an incapable entity as it does the perfect scapegoat for a system more adept at justifying its inadequacies than addressing them.