The involvement of the Houthis, more than a month into the U.S.-Israeli war, was not merely a matter of timing; it reflected the nature of their role. The Houthis did not enter as initiators but acted when Tehran decided that the Red Sea card needed to be played within a calculated framework. Consequently, their involvement came late and was limited—serving more as a pressure tool to raise costs and assert presence rather than as a military move capable of altering the course of the war. This explains the limited impact they have had so far.

The difference is significant

The Houthis can launch missiles and drones, disrupt Israel, and raise anxiety in the Red Sea, but they do not have what it takes to decide the battle or reverse its outcomes. There is a significant difference between a militia that increases security costs and a force that imposes a new equation on the ground. Therefore, exaggerating their engagement as a turning point is merely a mix of operational noise and genuine strategic impact.

However, this does not mean their impact is nonexistent. The Bab el-Mandeb is a sensitive maritime passage, and even the threat alone is enough to raise security costs, prompt some shipping companies to change their routes, and disrupt energy and trade markets. This is the role that has been assigned to the Houthis in this war. They do not actually close the strait but use it as a bargaining chip—which is precisely what Tehran wants from them: a tool of intimidation at the strait, nothing more.

But this card also has limits. The Houthis can disrupt more than they can control, and they can threaten more than they can sustain in an open and prolonged maritime confrontation. Any wide escalation in the Bab el-Mandeb will not go unanswered—not just by the United States and Israel, but also by regional and international forces that regard maritime security as a matter not to be taken lightly. Therefore, the Houthis operate within a calculated framework, causing disruption and raising costs, but without crossing all lines at once.

But the limits of this maneuver do not depend solely on capability. The Houthis understand that moving from mere threat to broad targeting of navigation—or expanding the engagement beyond this framework—could expose them to a larger confrontation with the United States and subject them to wider strikes they do not need at this stage. Therefore, they brandish the Bab el-Mandeb card more than they fully employ it, since the cost of slipping into open escalation could outweigh the benefits Tehran seeks to gain.

And it is not enough to simply rely on reduced Iranian support. The Houthis no longer depend solely on what Tehran directly provides; over the years, they have built smuggling and financing networks, as well as a war economy, that enable their continued operations. This means that reducing the threat is not just a matter of pressuring Iran—it also requires monitoring maritime routes, tracking smuggling paths through the Horn of Africa, securing supply networks within Yemen, and tightening controls on the components that allow this threat to be reproduced.

The result is that Yemen is the first to pay the price. The Houthis, as a militia managed by the Iranian regime, push all of Yemen—north and south—toward additional costs that are unrelated to the Yemenis’ interests. Every new escalation brings more isolation, greater economic pressure, and further disruption of any chance for a serious settlement. At this point, Yemeni legitimacy faces a new test: will it remain a spectator once again, or seize the opportunity to raise the issue of Al Hudaydah and regain the political initiative?

The Houthis entered the war late because they understand their limits, and Iran uses them because it understands their role. They do not possess the means to decide the war, but they can create a chronic threat to maritime passages and raise the cost of regional stability. The danger lies not in exaggerating their strength, but in allowing them to entrench this role in service of a transnational ideological project—leaving Yemen with nothing but further ruin.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.