The Egyptian government’s foreign policy amid the ongoing conflict between Israel, the United States, and Iran reflects its transition from a traditional regional power into a constrained middle power. This shift is rooted in domestic structural challenges exposed during the Arab uprisings more than a decade ago, particularly the disconnect between state and society, high youth unemployment, and limited social mobility.

Since Abdel Fattah el-Sisi came to power in 2014, the leadership has sought to balance multiple external actors to preserve and enhance its autonomy. However, this strategy is heavily shaped by economic dependence on Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. In 2025 alone, GCC countries invested around $41 billion in the country’s economy. Major deals, such as Qatar-backed tourism projects in Matrouh and the UAE’s ADQ investment in Ras Al-Hekma, underscore how reliance on inward investment, particularly in mega real estate developments, helps shape government foreign policy choices.

Security Pressures and Regional Alignments

The region surrounding Egypt has become increasingly complex. Instability in Libya since the ouster of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011, tensions with Ethiopia following the completion of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam in 2025, ongoing security concerns in Sinai, and Israel’s policy towards Gaza following the 7 October 2023 attacks by Hamas all contribute to a heightened threat perception.

In response, the government has strengthened coordination with Saudi Arabia, particularly regarding Yemen and Sudan, where Cairo has a range of interests, including maintaining historical ties, safeguarding Nile water security, and addressing economic and broader security considerations. A central concern is protecting maritime trade through the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, which connects the Red Sea to the Suez Canal, a crucial source of national revenue. Disruptions in this area have already affected the Suez Canal Authority's revenues in 2024 and could further constrain growth in the Suez Canal Economic Zone.

At the same time, broader regional alignments are shifting. The Abraham Accords have weakened collective Arab leverage by decoupling Palestinian statehood from normalisation with Israel, as outlined in the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. In response, emerging coordination between some or all GCC states, Egypt, and Jordan, alongside actors such as Turkey, Pakistan, and Indonesia, suggests the potential emergence of a broader coalition that could help counterbalance Israeli regional dominance and shifts in United States policy.

Opportunities in a Fragmented Regional Order

Amid these changing regional dynamics, a conflict involving Iran presents both risks and opportunities for Egypt. Historically, Egypt and Iran have represented competing regional visions: Egypt as a leader of Arab diplomacy following its 1979 peace treaty with Israel, and Iran as a proponent of a revolutionary Islamist order. However, shifting dynamics may create space for limited recalibration. Selective coordination has already emerged around shared interests, such as a nuclear weapons-free zone in the Middle East.

Egypt’s strategic opportunities lie in leveraging its diplomatic legacy and geostrategic position. It can continue to act as a leading mediator in Israeli-Hamas negotiations, as it has done for many years, including through initiatives such as the Board of Peace; position itself as a key guarantor of Red Sea security alongside Saudi Arabia, and deepen coalition-building with Gulf and Global South partners.

Importantly, the government can also play a normative role in re-establishing a regional de-escalation trend that began in the Gulf in 2021 by coordinating with key middle powers such as Turkey. Given Ankara’s growing diplomatic activism across multiple conflict theatres, from Africa to the Gulf, Egyptian-Turkish engagement offers a pragmatic channel for crisis management, confidence-building, and limiting spillover from an Iran-related escalation.

Such coordination would not require full strategic alignment but could function as a flexible, issue-based partnership aimed at stabilising key arenas and reducing the risk of wider regional confrontation. At the same time, cautious engagement with Iran, without undermining core Gulf alliances, offers a means to hedge against uncertainty and promote dialogue.

In sum, Egypt’s foreign policy is increasingly shaped by the intersection of domestic economic constraints and a rapidly shifting regional order. While its role as a dominant Arab power has diminished, its strategic location and diplomatic experience continue to provide avenues for influence among regional actors during a period of heightened instability.

Robert Mason is an Associate Professor at the Anwar Gargash Diplomatic Academy in the UAE.