When the 46th summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) convened on December 3, 2025, I wrote in this forum that, regardless of the detailed outcomes of the Gulf summit, its very convening is a significant achievement. This is because the GCC remains the only active Arab regional bloc, unlike the Arab Maghreb Union, which is experiencing structural stagnation—or rather, a state of clinical death—due to the Moroccan-Algerian dispute over Western Sahara.

However, regional developments quickly marred this image when the cloud of the Saudi-Emirati dispute loomed over the region. This crisis, however, did not destabilize the Gulf and seems to have been overcome, due to the greater challenge facing the entire region—namely, the American-Israeli war on Iran and the continued uncertainty regarding Washington and Tel Aviv's ability to decisively settle the conflict with Tehran.

The news of American-Iranian talks in Islamabad aimed at reaching a comprehensive resolution to the Gulf conflict and ending the war confirms that uncertainty will continue to dominate the region—until proven otherwise.

Despite talk that only weeks remain to return Iran to its “normal size” and make it submit to the American‑Israeli will, the military tug‑of‑war between Washington and Tel Aviv on one side and Iran on the other continues unabated.

Iran, despite being crushed and losing many of its leaders, remains steadfast; it has nothing left but to adopt the motto "If I go down, I'm not going down alone," especially after U.S. President Donald Trump threatened to target Iranian energy facilities, to which Tehran responded in kind, declaring that it would plunge the entire region into "total havoc," as the ancient Arabs would say—that is, saturate it with all evil.

Then came Trump’s announcement that he would suspend targeting Iranian energy facilities for five days, in order to allow an opportunity for negotiations and to avoid a full-scale military escalation.

It seems to be the destiny of the Gulf that the challenges it has faced, and still faces, often stem from Iran, though the first blow came from friendly fire when Saddam Hussein’s forces invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, after all the Gulf states had supported Baghdad during its eight‑year war with Tehran.

One of the positive outcomes of that war for the Gulf states—which brought danger closer to their borders, alongside the Iranian threat following the 1979 revolution and growing fears of its export—was that it served as a direct catalyst for the establishment of the GCC. Consequently, the need for joint economic, political, and security coordination became a more urgent strategic necessity than ever.

Due to new regional circumstances and the lack of trust in Iran, the Arab Gulf states have no choice but to work on further cooperation within the GCC. All its states are now in the same boat, and none have been spared from Tehran’s missiles, reinforcing the urgency of unity. Today, they are at a crossroads—to be or not to be—and thus must rely on what unites them and set aside what divides them.

In light of the prevailing uncertainty, the region remains faced with a number of potential scenarios.

Firstly, in the scenario of a continued Iranian threat, it would become necessary for the Gulf states to deepen their military coordination, revive joint defense projects, and further strengthen partnerships with the United States and other Western powers. Consequently, the GCC would become more cohesive, functioning more like a defensive alliance than merely an economic union.

Secondly, in the scenario of a reduced Iranian threat and a change in Tehran’s expansionist behavior, the Gulf states would need to reposition and reevaluate their priorities from security toward the economy by accelerating financial integration projects, issuing the long‑delayed Gulf currency, and enhancing joint investment and economic cooperation.

Thirdly, in the scenario of internal discord regarding the outcomes of the war on Iran, some Gulf states may seek to calm tensions with Tehran while others lean toward escalation. In such an environment, the GCC would continue to exist in form but with reduced effectiveness.

Given these facts, the future of the GCC after the war on Iran is likely to be determined more by the level of threat its member states face than by the war’s outcome alone.

In conclusion, there are two options: either the challenges will enforce the logic of deep integration, or they will reproduce old divisions in new forms. In either case, security will remain the guiding compass, while the real priority lies in moving from reactive measures to building a sustainable strategic partnership.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.