If the war in Iran and against it began over a year and eight months ago, Syria would have been on the front lines, aiding its master in Tehran, who was facing the war from the United States and Israel. Now, after the departure of Assad and his regime, Damascus has become cautious and works to avoid any direct involvement on either side of the warring factions in the region. However, this calm reaction should not be seen as a sign of reassurance.

The war has forced the young Syrian government to adapt to challenges such as Syrian casualties from war missiles saturating the skies over much of the region, as well as disinformation campaigns regarding its intentions and increased border threats from Iran's allies in Lebanon and Iraq. There is also the negative impact on its economy and the relentless effort to rebuild its system and state after Assad fled to Moscow and his regime fell in Damascus and across Syria. Yet Syria remains one of the highlights of President Trump's foreign policy. To keep it so, decision-makers need to remember that it remains a fragile state, prone to damage, and must be cautious to avoid the collateral damage it might suffer.

Before Assad's fall, Damascus was a "cog" in Iran's regional strategy, and Tehran managed to establish a "land bridge" between Iraq and Syria with Hezbollah in Lebanon, which it considered the crown jewel of its militia network in the region. Assad welcomed Iranian forces into his country from the start of the war against him, along with allied Shia militias from Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, and Pakistan, whose mission was to fight alongside him and defend him. The absence or removal of all of these meant—and still means—a halt to the missile launches from Syrian soil during the ongoing war between America and Israel on one side, and Iran on the other. Moreover, Assad's regime granted Russia full air freedom over its territory.

After fleeing to Moscow, its presence was confined to its bases, except for limited military interventions requested by the new regime to combat popular protests, mostly sectarian, against it. This gave Israel the freedom to destroy most of the new regime's military capabilities in Syria and allowed it to have full control over its airspace. However, it saddened many Syrians, especially Assad's opponents, as it weakened Syria's military power, forcing it to rebuild anew across all areas, including military and state institutions—knowing that the military campaign executed by the United States and Israel on Iran would have been more difficult if Assad were in power.

How did the ongoing war on Iran affect Syria? The energy sector has collapsed since the outbreak of the war, answers a serious American researcher. On February 28, Israel suspended natural gas exports to Egypt and Jordan. Egypt halted its exports to Syria that used to pass through Jordan. This is expected to negatively impact any progress achieved in Syria, especially in terms of electricity. Halting oil and gas operations in the Gulf countries also did not benefit Syria, and the memoranda of understanding signed with Saudi Arabia and other countries late last year might be in jeopardy. Given the harm to civilians and energy and military infrastructure in the Gulf, its governments might refocus on internal recovery and not follow through on various aid commitments they had made to Syria. During the war, Syria had to fight or face leaks through media and misinformation campaigns aimed at dragging it into the ongoing conflict or harming its stability.

Iran and its proxies spread false narratives about groups in Syria conducting attacks on American, Gulf, and Israeli coalition targets. The "Islamic Tawhid Supporters Authority" falsely claimed responsibility for launching missiles from the Golan Heights, and "Ansar Beit Al-Maqdis" announced strikes on American forces at Al-Shadadi base in northeast Syria, even though all American personnel had left this base before the war. Iran and its proxies also echoed a narrative that Syria planned to invade Lebanon alongside Israel to fight Hezbollah. In reality, Iran and its allies strongly wished for Syria to become involved in the ongoing war, as it would destabilize the country and reopen the corridor for transferring weapons and fighters between Iraq and Lebanon.

What about the security of regional diplomatic borders? Over the past week or so, the Syrian Ministry of Defense dispatched more troops to the borders with Lebanon and Iraq to ensure that Hezbollah and Iran-backed militias controlling the Popular Mobilization Forces would not infiltrate them to carry out destabilizing operations. In fact, American raids targeted the Popular Mobilization Forces in the Al-Qaim border area, and Syria arrested arms smugglers near the borders in the governorates of Homs and Deir Ezzor. Syrian officials were keen to emphasize that their security movements on the borders with Iraq and Lebanon were preventive. This message reached Washington.

What should the United States do at this stage in facing all this? It should coordinate the positions of organizations and the Iraqi government opposing the Popular Mobilization Forces. Secondly, it should build on the mutual border interests between Syria, Israel, and Lebanon. Thirdly, it should provide technological assistance for public protection and to prevent deliberate misinformation leaks. Fourthly, it should cooperate with partners to find alternative ways, routes, or railways for oil. Fifthly, it should be realistic about all economic prospects, especially in the short term. Finally, it should advise Syria not to give its citizens high expectations, particularly regarding achieving broad economic changes in the near future.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.