Iran’s treacherous attacks on Gulf countries have not been limited to missiles and drones. What is happening in the Gulf reveals another dimension of the conflict: disrupting transit through the Strait of Hormuz while simultaneously attempting to operate financing and espionage networks.

The announcement of the dismantling of cells linked to Hezbollah and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard in multiple Gulf countries, coinciding with attacks on cities and infrastructure, confirms that Tehran is betting on a parallel path to direct confrontation. This path targets the economy and internal security to raise costs and create political and security disruption in the region.

The dismantling by the UAE State Security of a network funded and managed by Hezbollah and Iran under the cover of a fake commercial enterprise aligns with the idea of a parallel path that Tehran is pursuing within the Gulf. Using economic fronts to launder money and finance activities related to sabotage and conspiracy means that the threat is not limited to missiles, but also strikes financial trust and attempts to turn the market into a channel for financing and operations. In this context, the UAE’s proactive security approach and oversight of commercial fronts exploited as a cover for infiltration is particularly significant.

In Kuwait, statements from the Ministry of Interior revealed cells linked to Hezbollah that planned to target vital facilities, sought to communicate with foreign entities and provide them with coordinates, and received foreign training including in weapons and drones. This shows the preparation of an internal operational capacity that could be activated with any escalation. The announcement of two cells within a few days suggests an effort to build internal pressure tools alongside missile and drone attacks in the ongoing conflict.

Qatar, which has repeatedly acted as a mediator with Tehran and opened communication channels during every crisis, announced the dismantling of two cells linked to the Revolutionary Guard. One cell was tasked with espionage and gathering information on vital and military facilities, while the other focused on sabotage and received drone training. This case expands the picture beyond Hezbollah and proves that Iran’s tools in the Gulf are not a single arm or function, but a distribution of roles across surveillance, financing, and preparation for sabotage. It also undermines the idea of “bridges of communication,” because targeting a mediation partner with internal cells makes returning to pre-conflict conditions much harder.

Bahrain provides the security background for the concept of “shadow cells” in Iran’s conflict with the Gulf. In 2016, Manama announced the dismantling of a group accused of establishing an entity under the name “Bahraini Hezbollah,” with charges including fundraising and planning violent acts. About two years later, the case expanded with 169 defendants referred to trial on charges related to joining a terrorist organization and training with weapons and explosives, with official references to support and training from the Revolutionary Guard. This is why Gulf countries decided in 2016 to classify Hezbollah as a terrorist organization for preventive reasons.

In the 2026 war, the same meaning returns in a more direct form. What Gulf countries are revealing today aligns with two parallel functions of these networks: elements held in reserve for immediate deployment during escalation, and networks quietly operating within society and the economy to gather intelligence, secure financing, and build hidden influence. This is why the vigilance of Gulf security agencies helps protect the home front from sabotage and safeguard national decision-making from infiltration.

Recent events explain why Washington is pushing for a broader and coordinated designation of the Revolutionary Guard and Hezbollah among its allies. The goal is both security and financial: to cut off funding, limit movement, and pursue networks operating under civilian and economic covers. In Lebanon, the cost is apparent for the state itself. Official Lebanese statements condemned the plots targeting the UAE and Kuwait, noting the government’s March 2, 2026 decision to ban Hezbollah’s military and security activities. With every development, it becomes clear that Hezbollah is no longer just a burden on the Gulf, but also on Lebanon, its position, and its relationships.

Since the beginning, the Gulf sought to spare the region from an open war and opened channels for de-escalation and dialogue, but realities have placed its countries within the scope of the conflict. The attacks targeted cities and infrastructure and extended to attempts to activate internal cells. Experience has proven that Gulf countries are not open arenas for these tools. Proactive control, financial oversight, and security coordination have all blocked attempts to turn the internal environment into a lever of pressure. Whether the war ends or continues, the principle remains: deterrence begins on the home front, and prevention is a condition for stability.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar