Every time the Gulf countries face an attack or threat, certain voices appear in the Arab media that do more than support the aggression—they openly celebrate it.

We saw this clearly in recent days when Iranian attacks targeted airports and civilian areas in the Gulf. Instead of a unified Arab response condemning attacks on cities where Arab civilians live, a few loud voices expressed a kind of gloating. The question is not just ethical but analytical: why do such attitudes appear? And why do they recur whenever the Gulf faces a crisis?

These voices can be divided into three main groups:

The first group is small and driven by personal grievances. Some of its members have worked in the Gulf and had negative experiences—perhaps due to breaking laws, professional disputes, personal resentment, or unmet expectations of wealth. These personal experiences sometimes turn into hostility, which is then unfairly generalized to entire societies. This kind of animosity is usually emotional rather than political.

The second group is shaped by ignorance or shallow political understanding. They consume news and analysis from the media without the ability to separate fact from propaganda. They are easily swayed by ideological, sectarian, or mobilizing rhetoric, adopting extreme positions without fully understanding the political complexities.

However, these two groups, though present, are not the most significant. The third group is the most important and worth examining. It includes commentators and writers who present themselves as political thinkers. They understand politics and have analytical tools, but they often take the wrong side due to preexisting ideological biases.

Historically, this group tends to bet on the losing side. In 1990, when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait, some of them claimed he had the “fourth largest army in the world,” could change the balance of power, and was on the verge of capturing Jerusalem. We know how that ended: Kuwait was liberated, and that narrative collapsed.

The same pattern appeared with Al-Qaeda. Some claimed that Osama bin Laden’s rise signaled a “historic victory” over the West. A few years later, it became clear that these groups had brought disaster to the region, and the idea of an imminent victory was nothing more than political illusion.

In recent years, the same pattern has repeated with some enthusiastic interpretations of events in Gaza. Instead of realistically assessing the balance of power, the massive humanitarian tragedy experienced by Palestinians was portrayed as if it were a prelude to inevitable victory. In reality, this rhetoric misled part of the Arab public, and even some of the Palestinian public.

The irony is that this same group now takes a hostile stance toward the Gulf countries when they face imposed wars. This raises a deeper question: why the Gulf countries in particular?

The Gulf states are not the only Arab countries with significant economic resources. Iraq, for example, possesses one of the largest oil reserves in the world. Libya is rich in oil resources, and Algeria also has substantial energy wealth. Yet these countries do not face the same level of campaigns targeting the Gulf. The Gulf countries have provided aid to other Arab nations generously—without seeking recognition—estimated at $900 billion by 2025, and to the Palestinian cause cumulatively since 1967 at about $110 billion, far exceeding what other countries have contributed.

The reason for the gloating attitude is usually not wealth alone, but the model of the state. Despite numerous challenges, the Gulf countries have, over past decades, achieved a degree of political stability and economic development. They have also played influential roles in the global economy and in the regional system. This success generates a form of political envy among certain elites in the region.

Additionally, the Gulf countries have become important economic and media hubs in recent decades, extending their influence beyond their geographic borders. The greater their political and economic presence, the more negative criticism or hostility they attract.

Yet political experience over the past decades reveals a clearer truth: many of these ideological positions have proven wrong over time. It can even be said that there is an unwritten rule in contemporary Arab politics: the side that receives the enthusiasm of these voices often ends up losing.

It is also notable that the more fiercely this group defends a position ideologically, and the louder their bullying rhetoric becomes, the more it often signals the weakness of that position rather than its strength. History teaches us that solid political realities do not need noise to prove themselves.

From this perspective, many of the campaigns against the Gulf countries can be read differently. They show that these voices are still trapped in a blindly ideological view of the world. For this reason, the question “Why do they hate us?” may not be the most accurate question. A more precise question might be: why do some analysts keep repeating the same mistakes in interpreting politics? The problem lies in the ideological lens through which they see the world.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar