Europe has long tried to delay acknowledging a truth that has been clear for two decades: the other side of the Atlantic is no longer a source of strategic and political certainty.

The Munich Security Conference 2026 reflected this European awakening. The shift manifested as a reordering of priorities. Europe paid a high price to learn the recurrent old wisdom that if you want something done right, you have to do it yourself.

NATO is not dead, but it awaits the post-Trump era. The concept of mutual commitment has irrevocably changed, with Europe turning to become a strategic and negotiating peer to the American ally, without replacing it. Thus, Europe fortifies itself against the fluctuating American politics, increasingly worried about relying on the American nuclear umbrella, which remains the cornerstone of their deterrence. Europe awakens slowly from the dream of American protection.

Europe redefines its strategic position in a multipolar world, not because it seeks strategic independence from NATO, but to ensure deterrence at a moment when Western adversaries may see an opportunity to test the West's strategic thresholds: deployable capacities, industrial depth, supply flexibility, and exploring nuclear consultation arrangements to mitigate dependence on the United States.

This is not the first time Europeans have discovered the boundaries of NATO's strategic guarantee. During the Suez Crisis of 1956, the British and French learned a bitter lesson: American anger can close the political horizon even for the closest allies.

In the 1950s, the European Defense Community project failed before it was born because its strategic identity was unable to create institutional momentum. Then, the Balkan War in the 1990s revealed Europe's inability to manage a war on its own doorstep without American leadership. Each of these turning points left a scar on the continent's memory, and here are the scars surfacing in Munich. When the reliability of the American partner declines, a "more European NATO" is required.

Such a transformation demands a shift from welfare protectorates to new comprehensive states: budgets, factories, supply chains, and common purchasing standards all need to be rethought. Plans entail long-term defense spending frameworks, annual plans, and the unification of the informational environment and equipment specifications.

Europe must wean off its American reliance in three ways:

1- Transition of the strategic narrative: As America is no longer a credible deterrent, Europe must have its own options.

2- Removal of bureaucratic and legal obstacles: sensitivities over sovereignty must be overlooked and Europe must coordinate combat systems.

3- Empowerment of tangible military capabilities: The nuts and bolts are warehouses, ammunition, integrated air and missile defense systems, deep-strike capabilities, reconnaissance, surveillance, and command and control. The greatest danger facing Europe is declaring its independence before the actual realization the strategy's credibility. The most dangerous moment is the moment of strategic ambiguity.

A temporary return of the E3 system

While waiting for comprehensive deterrence to materialize, Europe resorts to an operational alliance—Germany, France, and Britain. Germany pushes with its industrial bloc and formidable defense budget to achieve European sufficiency within NATO. France, in turn, presents its de Gaulle legacy doctrine: strategic self-management to leave the shadow of absolute reliance on Washington. After all, sovereignty without capabilities build an empty neighbor.

For its part, Britain offers operational and intelligence depth, its second nuclear power, and acts as a bridge between the European defense industry and Atlantic standards. Britain's history with American exceptionalism has not prevented it, in many instances, from recognizing the need for the continent's self-capacity. Despite the great weakness caused by Brexit, Munich made defense and industrial integration a British necessity.

In terms of nuclear security, the lesson is clear. European deterrence is no longer assured by the United States. It must be supported by readily-deployable capabilities.

This current picture carries significant risks: Europe's move toward a relatively independent assurance structure carries dual threats—Russia may interpret it as an Atlantic weakness, or America may see it as a questioning of the alliance's essence.

We learned from the European missile crisis in the 1980s how internal NATO divisions confused strategic calculations. Deterrence is not based solely on nuclear warheads, but on the unity of signals the West sends to its adversaries, deterring them from testing NATO's resilience.

In Munich, Europe enters as a competitive partner to Washington—industrially, economically, and geopolitically—where friction with America also emerged in trade, migration, industrial standards, and the limits of "shared values."

For its part, Washington behaves with authoritative logic: defense cooperation in exchange for alignment on economic and political issues. Europeans respond that the alliance does not mean delegation.

This friction was clearly embodied in the defense industry. With rising European spending, American companies will drool over their European competitors, challenging the economic protectionism logic founded by Trump himself, and geo-economic tension with America also rises—from energy policies to minerals to navigation routes.

12–24 month testing window

While Russia is eager to monitor European capabilities, any stumbling in major armament programs carries significant strategic risks. Therefore, Europe leans toward the most stable scenario. While renegotiating in NATO, injecting productive spending, reducing internal contradictions, and enhancing air defense readiness, munitions stocks, and command and control—with the U.S. remaining involved under clearer burden-sharing rules—the emphasis is on execution, not rhetoric and signals.

Europe does not build a continental army in Munich 2026, as some speeches at the conference suggested, nor does it declare a NATO withdrawal, as some capitals fear, but it wants to keep the United States close. Yet it also seeks to build a safety distance to ensure it will not fall if Washington pulls back.

And while power politics return to rule our world, this pragmatism seems the logical solution. For Europe, alliances are no longer ethical contracts, but interest arrangements tested with every crisis—leaving us with the question that perhaps remains open, maybe until another Munich:

Can Europe enhance its deterrence quickly enough to stave off another war?