Lebanon is no longer debating the gap law in abstraction. Last week, the International Monetary Fund concluded its Beirut visit, describing the talks as progressing at a “positive pace” while making one demand unmistakably clear: the hierarchy of claims must be respected, and no losses can be allocated to depositors before shareholders and junior creditors absorb theirs.

The conversation has shifted. The fight is no longer about whether a law is needed. It is about whether the text will hold.

Cabinet referred the draft Financial Stability and Deposit Recovery law to Parliament in late December. Since then, the political debate has revolved around promises: repayment of smaller deposits over four years, longer-dated instruments for larger balances, and the distribution of losses across the state, the central bank, banks, and depositors. The banking sector has formally objected. Revisions are now being prepared in light of IMF feedback. Parliament is expected to debate the file next, under the shadow of elections in May.

Momentum is real. But so is the risk of dilution.

This is precisely the phase where Lebanon has historically drifted — not at the moment of announcement, but during revision, negotiation, and amendment. Strategic ambiguity may help a draft survive politically, but ambiguity is also how enforceability disappears.

The IMF’s message this week is not ideological. It is structural. Hierarchy of claims. Loss allocation. Alignment with international principles. In other words: proof before persuasion.

The country now stands at a crossroads. The law can become a binding framework that forces the system to behave differently, or it can be a bandaid, giving cover to a problem whose root causes the government fails to address.

If we want the first outcome, the next ninety days matter more than the next ten years. 

Credible reform does not begin with speeches. It begins with exhibits. Before any timetable is trusted, four documents must exist in enforceable form and be publicly accessible.

First, a loss bridge that details the full financial gap, the methodology used to calculate it, and independent validation. Without methodological transparency, numbers remain negotiable.

Second, a repayment cashflow with both a base case and a downside scenario. Promises without stress-testing are political narratives, not financial plans.

Third, a legally verified asset schedule clarifying what is usable under existing law, what is restricted, and what would require additional legislation. Asset references without legal clarity create a grey area.

Fourth, a bank resolution roadmap with sequencing, governance oversight, and deadlines that do not drift. Deposit recovery without restructuring architecture is a promise without a vehicle.

These are not technical add-ons. They are the difference between posturing and practicality.

The public debate has focused heavily on the figure of 782,000 accounts identified for full repayment over four years. That number matters. But what matters more is whether the mechanism behind it is documented, financed, and insulated from discretionary amendment once headlines fade.

Political will may be uneven. Elections may create pressure either to act quickly or to postpone difficult choices. Resistance from vested interests is predictable. None of this is new.

What is new is that Lebanon is no longer speaking only to itself. The IMF’s presence has turned this into a credibility test under external scrutiny. The question is no longer whether a draft exists. It is whether the final text will structurally embed loss hierarchy, enforceable timelines, and transparent publication duties.

Lebanon does not need a perfect law. It needs a law that cannot be quietly diluted after passage.

Debate exhibits, not personalities. Track deadlines, not declarations. When a political leader speaks about the law, ask one disciplined question: where in the text is the hierarchy of claims secured, and when will the supporting exhibits be published?

A country that cannot agree on a shared base reality cannot negotiate fairness, sacrifice, or recovery. The next weeks will determine whether this moment of pressure produces enforceable structure or another cycle of reassurance.

Proof is the only currency left.

The IMF has said so in its own language. Now Parliament must decide whether to mint it — or spend what little credibility remains.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.