Amending the Gap Law: War between bankers and the 'DERP' Program

Business Tech 24-02-2026 | 14:23

Amending the Gap Law: War between bankers and the 'DERP' Program

The core problem exacerbated since 2019 is not just a financial gap, but the collapse of trust between banks and depositors, halting both credit and savings.
Amending the Gap Law: War between bankers and the 'DERP' Program
Association of Banks Study
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More than six years after the crisis, and while depositors are still waiting to recover their savings in the midst of a severe recession, the head of the Finance and Budget Committee, MP Ibrahim Kanaan, called for a session tomorrow, Tuesday, accompanied by the Financial Regularization and Deposits Recovery Bill (Gap Law) and government amendments to the Banking Reform Act.

 

In parallel, the Association of Banks circulated a study prepared by the company Ankura, which includes amendments aimed at relieving the burden on banks, most notably the sale of part of the gold reserves to pay the first $100,000 of each deposit instead of banks bearing 40% of the cost. It includes deducting what depositors have previously received under Central Bank circulars from the guaranteed ceiling and imposing additional losses on the state through public debt in favor of the Central Bank. The proposal suggests writing off part of the deposits before affecting the banks' capital and accounting for the Central Bank's reserves as part of the banks' contribution in the first tier, demanding guarantees for financial sustainability, in an effort to reduce the cost of recapitalization on shareholders.

 

Meanwhile, a different approach is proposed by banking expert Ghantous Jamil under the title of the Deposits and Economy Recovery Plan (DERP). The Lebanese government's plan to recover deposits is based on financial restructuring to address the gap between commitments and capabilities in distributing the burdens between the state, the Central Bank, and the banks. However, the ongoing discussion reflects widespread concerns among depositors that the resolution may disguise deductions or set a long-term schedule that functionally taxes the actual value of the deposits.

 

In this context, Jamil presents the DERP as an alternative option based on his belief that deposit protection does not occur through managing scarcity but by restarting economic engines via productive credit. The core problem that has worsened since 2019, in his view, is not limited to a financial gap but a fundamental breakdown in trust between banks and depositors, paralyzing both credit and savings. The banking sector has effectively stalled, and the economy has slipped into a cash-dependent pattern while millions of depositors remain deprived of unrestricted access to their funds.

 

Previous measures of partial withdrawals and arbitrary ceilings have not succeeded in restoring confidence or launching a new production cycle, leading to high unemployment and a sharp decline in purchasing power. Based on this diagnosis, Jamil believes that any plan that does not reactivate credit will be insufficient to achieve real recovery.

 

The DERP serves as a roadmap extending over two years, addressing both the deposit crisis and economic paralysis at once. Instead of depleting limited liquidity through sporadic withdrawals, it proposes an organized credit launch to stimulate investment, create job opportunities, and improve income, gradually reducing fear of mass withdrawals while providing graded protection for all deposits. The implementation mechanism involves coordination among three main parties.

 

The Central Bank continues to pay monthly amounts to depositors consistent with the size of their deposits, alongside granting commercial banks credit lines estimated at about $8 billion according to the size of their customers' deposits and their balances with it. These lines are funded from free reserves and available assets, and if needed, from Lebanon's gold reserves, which have increased in value as a strategic asset. The aim is to provide targeted liquidity for productive sectors, not random consumer financing, with banks using these funds exclusively for lending to productive and social sectors and individuals, under strict standards set by the Central Bank.

 

In return, banks commit to a minimum profitability to generate free liquidity for depositor payments, suspend dividend distribution to their shareholders, and embark on a gradual recapitalization path over 5 to 7 years in line with international standards. In this path, banks transform from crisis-managing entities into institutions contributing to growth production. Depositors benefit from a gradual release of their deposits in tandem with regaining the right to credit access.

 

Deposit protection, in this vision, is achieved through an economy that generates income and jobs, not through continuous withdrawal rationing. The program's benefits extend to various aspects of the economy.

 

Depositors gradually recover their funds, reducing financial pressures on them, restoring consumption and saving patterns to their normal course. The economy records actual growth with job creation, improved purchasing power, and a resurgence of investment. Cash economy gradually declines, while the state benefits from increased tax and customs revenues with economic recovery. Thus, social security and unions witness an increase in subscriptions and an improvement in resources, while the Central Bank gradually regains its strategic role, reducing banking panic.

 

DERP's bet is on a choice contrary to the logic of merely distributing losses, while the approach is based on protecting deposits through growth and reconnecting the economy to its natural foundations: credit, work, savings, and trust.