Dr. Wadiha El Amiouni

Since the proclamation of Greater Lebanon, the Lebanese system has been based on an exceptional political formula that combines consociational democracy with sectarian power sharing. This formula was enshrined in the Constitution of 1926 and later reproduced in a different form by the Taif Agreement of 1989.

While the first Constitution granted the President of the Republic a central position in executive authority within a clearly presidential system, Taif brought a radical shift in the philosophy of governance. It transferred actual executive power to the Council of Ministers as a collective body and turned the President of the Republic into more of a symbol of state unity rather than a decisive center of political decision making.

However, although Taif succeeded in ending the civil war, it did not succeed in building a stable state capable of overcoming structural divisions. It entrenched parity between Muslims and Christians and reorganized sectarian balances instead of abolishing them, which kept the system trapped in the logic of power-sharing and sectarian tensions.

At the heart of Lebanon’s current crisis, the constitutional gaps left unaddressed by the Taif Agreement are clearly visible. The agreement did not set binding deadlines for forming governments after the designation of their prime ministers, which opened the door to long vacancies that disrupted state functioning and led to repeated political paralysis. It also did not impose a deadline on the President of the Republic to call for binding parliamentary consultations, which allowed constitutional milestones to be turned into tools of pressure and political bargaining.

More critically, the reduction of the President’s powers was not accompanied by the establishment of clear constitutional mechanisms for resolving disputes between institutions. When political forces clash, no internal authority is capable of imposing a solution, pushing the country toward dependence on external settlements and regional or international mediation to reactivate its institutions. As a result, national decision-making retreats in the face of external influence, while the concept of “charter-based” governance expands as a tool of political obstruction.

Over time, charter-based governance evolved from a guarantee of partnership into a means of imposing a “veto” within the political system. Article 95 of the Constitution, which stipulates fair sectarian representation in government, has been interpreted in a way that allows any sectarian component to paralyze state institutions whenever its interests are perceived to be threatened. Over the past two decades, Lebanon has witnessed repeated instances of ministers resigning or boycotting cabinet sessions in order to strip the executive authority of its “charter legitimacy.”

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.