Can U.S. President Donald Trump exit the war with Iran before or without expanding it? I don’t believe we are facing a potential ceasefire.
What we are seeing is a desperate effort by mediators, led by Pakistan, to find a temporary solution to halt hostilities. The proposals on the negotiation table could stop the fighting for 15 to 20 days, during which Americans and Iranians would discuss a permanent resolution or a lasting solution for the Strait of Hormuz. We do not know whether the United States has accepted these proposals, even though they were presented to them some time ago. However, what we do know is that the Iranians are unlikely to accept them, as they still retain some strength. I do not believe we are seeing a potential ceasefire at this stage. What we are currently witnessing is not direct negotiations between Iran and the United States, although there are, of course, some indirect messages between Tehran and Washington.
We only see talks between mediators who speak with the conflicting parties. Moreover, Western intelligence has reported that American negotiators do not know whom they are talking to in Tehran, although there is no strong evidence for these reports. Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi was a negotiator with Trump’s personal envoy, Steve Witkoff, last year, up until the final stage. The available accounts suggest that the Israelis removed Araghchi from the list of Iranian figures to be assassinated, along with Ghalibaf, the Speaker of the House, because they were the interlocutors with mediators.
Finally, we have noticed, even seen, cohesion within the Iranian regime since the beginning of the war (interrupted by Ghalibaf declining to participate in the negotiating delegation). This is what an Asian researcher, who is closely monitoring international and regional situations, states. He adds that he treats anything said with a grain of salt and seeks verification, because there is an ongoing war on the ground, observed passively. In other words, the Americans are uncertain with whom they should negotiate in Tehran or with whom they are currently negotiating, especially after reports to Washington indicating some confusion following the overthrow in the first days of the war of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and other senior figures. There is some confusion in Tehran. What I can say now is that President Trump is in a difficult situation. Anyone who reads his tweets and statements forms the impression that he is angry because the Iranians are not doing what the Venezuelans did, and is also frustrated.
He needs somehow to be able to declare victory forcefully and firmly despite the significant damage inflicted by the American military on Iran, which alone cannot be considered a victory. To declare victory, President Trump would need to achieve a significant triumph by expanding the war.
Was the ceasefire a victory for Trump, even though he achieved little during it and was forced to extend it, despite confirming that negotiations would be based on the ten points established by the Iranian regime and conveyed to Trump through mediators?
The same Asian non-Arab researcher answers: It seems the Iranians “threw Trump a bone,” if it can be said that way. They acknowledged that there are two proposed plans to end the war: the American proposal, comprising 15 points and rejected by Iran, and their own, comprising ten points. The differences between the plans are significant, and they may only be suitable for discussion during ongoing fighting and before a ceasefire, as part of negotiations. It will be very difficult to bridge or eliminate these differences in talks.
It appears that Iran is moving toward negotiations from a position of greater strength than the Americans. They still maintain leverage over the Strait of Hormuz. The ceasefire does not answer the following question: what does free passage through the strait mean during the agreed two-week ceasefire? Will Iran be able to collect transit fees from ships? What happens when an American ship crosses the strait for the first time? What will Israel do if there are ships attempting to cross with part of their cargo destined for, or owned by, it—especially if Iran prevents their passage or detains them?
These questions open the door to another one: what role will Israel play during the two-week ceasefire and after it, given that its position is to continue the war on Iran?
The same Asian non-Arab researcher answers: Israel must issue an official statement about the ceasefire, knowing that it has no choice but to accept it. It will not be satisfied with it, or even simply unhappy with it. We can expect it to attempt to undermine or weaken the talks during the ceasefire, but in a way that does not embarrass its ally Trump in these difficult days. Israel’s ambitions in this regard are for the ceasefire agreement to also apply to Lebanon and possibly Gaza. We must wait to see what Israel will do, especially in Lebanon, knowing that Israel violates the ceasefire agreement with Lebanon declared in 2024 on a daily basis by continually targeting Hezbollah, which is aligned with Iran. In the end, we must wait to see the outcome of the negotiations, since up to now neither Israel nor the United States has succeeded in achieving all of their objectives in the war against Iran, particularly regarding the elimination of Iran’s nuclear project, its ballistic missile program, and its relationship with allied organizations in several Arab countries.
In summary, the extent to which America and Israel achieve their war objectives must wait until the negotiations between the United States and Iran conclude. Trump’s alternating statements of anger and satisfaction regarding Iran do not appear to change this reality. His anger seems to stem from frustration, as he is forced to acknowledge Iran’s ability to challenge assumptions about political authority and military power. At the same time, returning to war would be very difficult for Trump, especially with the midterm congressional elections approaching. He also faces American public opinion, which was angered by his remarks about eliminating Iranian civilization.
Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.