In the Muscat negotiation board, the regional drama unfolds in all its dimensions! We see positive signs on the surface, but they implicitly conceal deep disagreements, as Tehran doesn’t know what Trump will accept: a narrow interim deal, or inevitably a "comprehensive settlement"?

Beyond disagreements over the form and scope of a solution, the diplomatic window between the U.S. and Iran opened with an empty agenda. While both sides express a desire to continue "talks," each seeks to define its own boundaries.

Araghchi describes the first session as "positive" and "a good start," but he quickly sets a clear boundary: "Our talks topic is purely nuclear." Conversely, reports indicate that Washington has not softened its insistence on covering a broader range of issues: missiles, proxies, and human rights.

In light of this contradiction, the Muscat talks are less "arms reduction" negotiations and more crisis management under pressure: discussions to avoid an immediate explosion, and coercion and escalation to compel the other side to make concessions later.

Thus arises a less romantic question: What kind of deal is possible in an environment of extreme distrust, where each side fears that any concession made today will be worthless tomorrow?

Even in a forced negotiation, the first round centers on defining the problem. Tehran seeks to confine it to the nuclear file, while Washington aims to resolve the Iranian dilemma once and for all, driven by its alliances and the pursuit of strategic deterrence.

Washington even views the nuclear file as a necessary first step, a foundation for addressing other issues, while Tehran sees it as the end of the line.

According to Araghchi, Tehran elevates the enrichment decision from a mere technical matter to a symbol of sovereignty. Yet Washington approaches it not from a rights perspective, but through the lens of economic and even military coercion.

According to The National, Washington is imposing new sanctions on imports from countries that buy Iranian goods—directly or indirectly—at a rate of 25%, targeting anyone doing business with Iran. This approach follows a simple logic: it reduces Iran's margin for maneuver and greatly increases the cost of playing for time.

For its part, despite living under sanctions, Iran remains wary of their persistence even after making concessions. In this context, Tehran may prefer a short-term deal or prolong negotiations to buy time and manage costs. The more complex dilemma in these talks emerges here: even if an agreement on the agenda and on the margins for overt or covert bargaining is possible, the core problem remains the weakness of future assurances.

In these negotiations, the sequence of bargains and their interconnections becomes more important than 'negotiation principles': Which topic is addressed first, and how can a party back out mid-negotiation from previously agreed points?

It is conceivable to agree on a "limit for relaxation": clear ceilings on the nuclear program and uranium stockpile, expanded monitoring and verification, in exchange for targeted partial sanction relief that can be quickly revoked if compliance falters. In this sense, such a deal would not end the conflict but would manage its risks.

Beyond negotiation tactics, it is clear that both parties are negotiating not only with each other but also with their own constituencies.

Internal American dynamics push for a short, fast pace—a desire for "a visible achievement to save Trump's face." Meanwhile, the Iranian side emphasizes a sovereign discourse of "enrichment" and "resilience" against pressure, with acute sensitivity to any concession that might appear gratuitous.

Most importantly, both parties openly collude in disregarding a sensitive issue - the "taboo that no one wants to touch" - namely, that Israel is an integral part of these negotiations.

Israel's interest lies either in fully addressing Iran's regional threats - nuclear, missiles, and proxies - or in an agreement that stabilizes the theater without easing pressures, keeping a hand on the trigger.

It is a historic opportunity for Israel to alter the strategic context of the regional conflict. The stars have aligned for it in an unprecedented way, with all international powers giving it free rein to dismantle the 'resistance front.' Consequently, Israel insists on neutralizing direct Iranian strategic threats. Otherwise, it risks losing this historic opportunity, and all its achievements since October 7 would amount merely to closing one cycle of conflict, setting the stage for the next.

Araghchi says, "Our atomic bomb is the power that says no to major powers." While this signal may bolster the regime's domestic standing, it sharply increases American caution and Israeli resolve, raising the risk that naval incidents or proxy actions could ignite an uncontrolled conflict.

From the perspective of the technocrats around President Bezos, they face the rigidity of the state's doctrinal structure and its limited adaptability, especially under the new round of American sanctions, while the political system moves further into forced control of the economy and society.

These factors carry significant latent fragility: internal hardening in Iran raises the cost of mistakes, increases information distortion, and makes retreat more difficult.

Conversely, Trump knows the cost of appearing deceived in front of his audience - not because he raised the negotiating ceiling, but because any current agreement will inevitably be compared to Obama’s 2015 deal.

At that point, he will face critics not only in Israel but across the U.S. political spectrum—from Democrats who will inevitably compare any deal to Obama’s 2015 agreement, to significant Republican factions who see a partial nuclear deal as a concession that leaves missiles and proxies unchecked. These opponents are likely to join forces to block it, politically or practically.

As Netanyahu declares that Israel must militarily detach from the U.S. within five years, and as his security officials insist that any deal disregarding Israel's interests "is worthless," Trump can anticipate what he’ll hear during Netanyahu’s upcoming Washington visit: Israel will not be responsible for regional calm with Iran unless its demands are met. And with numerous cards on the ground, Israel could prevent Trump from reaping the domestic and regional benefits of the "peace agreements."

International financial circles estimate a 75% likelihood of confrontation and escalation if no mechanisms exist to ensure permanent commitment, returning the conflict to its recurring cycle: calm followed by tension, punctuated by sudden shocks—financial, political, or military—that reshuffle the deck.

Thus, after 25 years of negotiation, the cards are exposed and the path is clear. The question becomes: Does Tehran need war?

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar.