Gaza is no longer merely a hotspot of chronic conflict but has clearly turned into a testing ground for international intentions, where the limits of what is politically possible are tested, along with the ability of major powers to impose new models for managing conflicts rather than resolving them. The announcement of the formation of a “Peace Council” to administer Gaza, and the rapid regional and international reactions that followed, reveal that the issue is no longer confined to the Palestinian enclave alone, but has become a mirror reflecting deeper transformations within the international system itself, between the logic of traditional multilateralism and attempts to reengineer peace through parallel frameworks led by a single power.

The most prominent development was the joint statement issued by the foreign ministers of eight Arab and Islamic countries, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Jordan, Turkey, Indonesia, and Pakistan, which welcomed the US invitation to join the Peace Council and affirmed its goal to establish a permanent ceasefire, support the reconstruction of Gaza, and push towards a just peace that ensures the Palestinians' right to self-determination and statehood in accordance with international law. This collective stance cannot be read as an open authorization but rather as a calculated bet that engagement is better than leaving the field to be managed entirely by a unilateral logic.

In this context, the meeting between Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and US President Donald Trump in Davos reflects this political pragmatism, with Egypt welcoming participation in the council, while emphasizing that the success of the second stage requires positive action and full cooperation, without abandoning the constants related to the Palestinian cause or the role of the national state in maintaining stability. The Egyptian position here reflects a mature understanding, participating to reduce risks, not to provide a blank check.

Meanwhile, the European Union emerges as the silent partner. While heavyweight European countries like France, Germany, Sweden, Norway, and Italy refuse to join the council in its current form, fearing it undermines the role of the United Nations, Europe appears stuck in a silent dilemma. It cannot publicly confront Washington, nor does it want to be excluded from arrangements that might reshape the Eastern Mediterranean, but so far, it confines itself to humanitarian and financial support, without real political engagement with the core of the initiative. This approach may make Europe a partner in crisis management, not in crafting the solution, leaving a political void filled by long-term transitional arrangements.

On the Palestinian side, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, whose formation is presented as an independent technocratic body, stands in a middle ground between realism and constraint. It is an attempt to break the “Hamas or occupation” binary, yet it remains hostage to harsh conditions: the continuation of the ceasefire, the opening of border crossings, and the granting of real rather than merely symbolic authority. Historical experience in Gaza makes it clear that any civilian administration without a political horizon and without international security guarantees will remain fragile, regardless of the good intentions of those running it.

What stands out about the “Peace Council” is not only the breadth of countries that have accepted the invitation, as the US envoy Steve Witkoff said that between 20 and 25 world leaders had agreed to join, but also the nature of the council itself. Its charter grants Donald Trump a founding presidency for life, with broad powers that include inviting members, extending or terminating their membership, and exercising an effective veto over decisions. Permanent membership is also tied to an explicit financial condition: the payment of one billion dollars in the first year. This formula raises a fundamental question about the nature of legitimacy. Are we facing an international framework, or a political-financial club in which conflict files are managed according to influence and the ability to pay?

The matter does not stop at Gaza. The founding charter, as leaked to the media, does not explicitly mention the Strip, instead referring to a global role for the council in “conflict-affected areas,” which reinforces European concerns that the initiative represents a parallel alternative to the United Nations rather than a mechanism to support it. This helps explain the opposition of countries such as France, which views bypassing the UN’s institutional framework as weakening the principle of multilateralism and politicizing peace instead of internationalizing it.

From the Israeli perspective, the position has been ambiguous: a preliminary acceptance of council membership, coupled with a clear objection to the formation of an executive council for Gaza without coordination, particularly given the presence of a Turkish role that Tel Aviv strongly rejects. This reflects Israel’s longstanding contradiction: a desire to control the security situation in Gaza without accepting any framework that could restrict its freedom of action or impose unwanted partnerships.

At the heart of the picture, it becomes clear that what is unfolding is less a strategic breakthrough than a more tightly managed transitional arrangement. Trump is not seeking a radical solution so much as a form of “manageable stability” that eases international pressure, prevents an explosion, and perhaps opens the door to using the council later in other conflicts. Israel wants security and control, not full international administration. Palestinians want a normal life, without being reduced to a permanent humanitarian case. Europe fears marginalization but remains hesitant. Arab states have chosen engagement in an effort to adjust the course from within.

The real question, therefore, is no longer who governs Gaza, but whether Gaza is being administered temporarily as a step toward breaking the cycle, or managed indefinitely under new labels. So far, the indicators suggest that we are still inside the same circle, but with softer walls, more polished rhetoric, and more glamorous names. The Peace Council may succeed in securing a ceasefire, organizing relief, and launching a regulated reconstruction, and perhaps in dismantling some sources of violence. But it will not become genuine peace unless administration turns into policy, the truce into a political horizon, and power into legitimacy grounded in Palestinians’ right to self-determination.

Gaza does not only need someone to govern it, but someone with the courage to break the equation of governing it forever.

Disclaimer: The opinions expressed by the writers are their own and do not necessarily represent the views of Annahar