The history of political and economic protests in Iran in the years following the Islamic Revolution dates back to 1992, 33 years ago, specifically in the city of Mashhad in northeastern Iran. Since then, a series of serious protests broke out and had notable repercussions. These include:

• Protests against inflation and rising prices in 1995 in Eslamshahr, south of Tehran
• Student protests in 1999
• Political protest over the results of the 2009 elections
• Protests in 2017 in Mashhad over rising prices and inflation
• Protests in 2019 in several cities after a gasoline price increase
• Nationwide protests in 2022 following the death of Mahsa Amini (who died in police custody due to allegedly violating Iran’s mandatory hijab laws)
• Protests in early 2026 in Tehran and other cities over economic and living conditions

Out of eight protests against the Islamic Republic, at least five were driven by economic reasons. Of course, in every protest movement there are also secondary causes, and protesters use the opportunity to voice other demands.

Regarding the causes and trajectory of protests in Iran, four main narratives compete in the media to persuade public opinion.

First narrative: The “pure economic protest”

The first narrative claims that the latest protest in Iran also belongs to the category of economic protests that emerged as a result of years of economic stagnation - especially since 2018 (when U.S. sanctions returned after Washington exited the nuclear deal) - along with rising inflation and price hikes, leading up to the continued increase in the value of the U.S. dollar. The protests began in the mobile phone market and then spread to other markets in Tehran and several cities. Supporters of this narrative argue that most dissatisfied citizens and protesters are seeking relative welfare and an improved livelihood; and that if the political system can respond to these demands, calm will return to the country.

Second narrative: The government’s interpretation ... “hostile political protest”

When economic and labor slogans became more widespread and took on a political tone, and some chants were launched against the Supreme Leader of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and in favor of Reza Pahlavi (son of the former Shah and the leading monarchist opposition figure abroad), the labor and economic protest turned into a political protest calling for regime change, forming the second narrative.

For this reason, the security system intensified its dealings with protesters. Khamenei emphasized in his speech on January 3 the need to deal firmly with them. U.S. President Donald Trump’s threat to intervene if Iran suppressed the protests also affected the Islamic Republic’s strong reaction, and state media described the protesters as “rioters” and considered them agents of America and Israel.

This type of interpretation of protests in Iran has a history that dates back as far as the protests themselves. The difference in the government’s interpretation during this period is only that the executive branch, specifically the government of Masoud Pezeshkian (the Iranian president elected in 2024), acknowledged in its statements the rights of protesters and decided to increase cash support for citizens. However, the government has no control over the security, police, and military institutions, which take their orders from the ruling system.

Third narrative: The opposition’s call for external intervention

The other side of the political, regime-change interpretation of the protests belongs to the opposition and critics of the Islamic Republic, who believe that external intervention by the United States and Israel is legitimate for overthrowing the political system. According to them, it is not possible to change Iran’s political system through civil protests, and that such change is only possible through intervention by the U.S. and Israel. The main proponent of this narrative is Reza Pahlavi, and his supporters inside and outside the country.

This narrative has strong opponents in Iran, those who believe that the situation in Iran is not so bad as to require turning to an external enemy to be freed from it.

Fourth narrative: The system is in a phase of gradual collapse

There is a fourth group within Iran that believes that the Islamic Republic system has failed in adapting its decisions and capacities, inside and outside Iran, over the past four decades, resulting multi-layered dissatisfaction on cultural, economic, social, and political levels. In foreign relations, it has led to multiple failures of the political system in managing relations with other countries, especially major powers.

According to this narrative, which is endorsed by some academic elites, the Islamic Republic has reached a stage of inefficiency and loss of legitimacy, and has even lost the ability to rebuild itself, including during historical opportunities. This group points to the moment of national solidarity after the 12-day war (the June 2025 Iran–Israel conflict, which lasted 12 days and involved Israeli airstrikes on Iranian targets) as an example, during which the Islamic Republic could have reviewed its policies and reduced the gap with the population.

Based on this view, at every crisis regardless of its roots or pretexts, Iran will witness a protest movement, and each movement will reduce the government’s capacity to resist, control, or suppress, ultimately leading to its collapse. This group believes there are two reasons why protest movements have not succeeded so far: first, the Islamic Republic does not face a strong opposition capable of acting as a credible alternative to the current system; and second, the system’s capacity for control and repression is high, and there is no analytical or explanatory framework that clarifies the necessity of transitioning away from the current system, what they describe as a transition discourse or ideology.

Which narrative is more realistic will be determined by future developments in Iran, but one undeniable truth is that any political system, including the Islamic Republic, can avoid collapse through essential reforms such as conducting a referendum, changing the constitution, and altering domestic and foreign public policies to reduce dissatisfaction and eliminate the basis for large-scale national protests.